September 28th, 2007美联储想让作空黄金的公司破产?
Kitco国际黄金市场评论-9月28日
【2007.09.28 10:05】 来源：和讯网 作者：Jon Nadler
和讯特约
如同周三一样，周四的行情又坐了一天过山车。纽约黄金现价全天振荡在727美元到737美元之间的10元区域内，终盘报收于732.50美元，上涨了4.70美元。这是一个脆弱的区间–将最近刚刚冷却一点的火热的市场岩浆包裹其中。因为黄金仍视原油和美元的脸色行事，同时又受制于投资者的心理反应以及大基金的走势算计。白银上涨了13美分，报收13.48美元。铂金再次收于新高1357.00美元/盎司，补涨12美元。某投资银行让其客户由黄金转到铂金的建议今天算是应验了。以下是对全天走势的描述：
先是美元对欧元下跌（再创新低），然后在GDP数据的鼓舞下上涨，最后又下跌。所有这些都令金价亦步亦趋。美元指数现为78.34点。另一方面，今日黄金的初期走势也可说是在预料之中，因为市场参与者对今天即将公布美国房屋销售数据、2季度GDP数据与首次申请失业救济人数及其内容充满了忌惮。
周四，在GDP数据（二季度增长3.8%–不算坏）以及好于预期的申领失业救济人数公布之后，我们看到基金在大量出货。但同时，由于美国住房销售数据强调了房市仍处于疲软状态，因此，当金价跌至727美元低点时又有人吸纳。基金主导了这一10美元的区间。对于在市场激流中沉浮的中小投资者来说，今天可不是安全的一天。在这些追涨杀跌的基金面前，谁打算做一只挡车的螳螂？
当交易性质转向依赖双重的负面预期（首先是经济数据，然后是随之而来的降息假设）时，你知道市场已经非常情绪化了。哪怕是与统计数据预期不一致的一点点偏差都有可能造成市场方向不明的大幅振荡。新闻服务机构说，债券价格和股票期货都是跟随传闻而非真实的数据来涨跌的。我们很快就会知道他们的信息是否正确。
原油价格大幅回升，涨了近2美元，达到82.18美元/桶。每当气象频道提到热带低压，石油群众们便要疯狂一回。当然，除非石油试图发现某种不同类型的风暴–酝酿于沙漠而非海洋中的那种。
到目前为止，黄金市场上的超买情况已经持续了三周，并有可能出现调整–任何调整–看起来挺困难的一种局面，不过新闻依然对多方有利。
尽管新屋销售数据确实很差，但它仅仅强调了一个事实，即某些房地产相关企业早在它们看不到什么买家之前就已经大幅裁员了。例如Lennar（美国顶级的房屋建造商之一），就已将人手裁掉了惊人的35%。你认为它们对未来几个季度的房地产市场会怎么看？人们会手持彩票搭帐篷露营等着买300美元/平方英尺的麦克豪宅么？您再想想。
现在，有一个具有深远背景的因素值得我们去密切关注，那就是来自美国和它的新死敌伊朗之间日益升级的外交辞令及不断恶化的肢体语言。对于事态的发展方向，我们不想做天要塌之类的推测，不过，值得一提的是，我们的Google新闻搜索已经将一些关键词放在题头，以便大家快速检索。比如"即将"这样的词……
评论的最后，我们收到了几封读者的E-mail，要求我们解释一下为什么联储会同意–不，是积极推动–金价涨到28年来的高位，在他们看来，事实上除了受到部分邪恶的阴谋集团的影响之外市场并不具备上涨条件。我们向这些发信人致敬，不过我们的回答是，这个问题应该去问那些向我们保证了好多年，声称金价不可能涨过400美元更别提700美元的人。也许美联储想让那些据说在大规模作空的公司破产，再在国内的金融伤口上撒把盐。对此我们毫无线索。不过，我们在几周前还收到过一封E-mail，控告我们是黑暗势力的一分子。这可真是太好了……
(文中时间为美国东部时间)
September 28th, 2007 at 1:02 pm
标题:我在缅甸当和尚
我在缅甸当和尚
我第一次被缅甸“俘虏”是在听到“仰光”这个词的时候，当时感觉怎么有那么奇怪的国家，首都竟然叫“阳光”。那时候我就希望自己有一天能去会会这个“阳光”。这个愿望就在我工作第三年实现了。出乎意料的是，我在缅甸还当了一个星期的和尚。
更多精彩图片
佛教是缅甸的国教，缅甸“全民信佛，男丁皆僧”，全国各地都有高大宏伟的寺庙。首都仰光号称“千寺之城”，有大小寺庙1900多个。
缅甸的男人一生至少出家一次，出家次数不限，时间可长可短，有的终身当和尚，更多的则是几年、几个月甚至一两个星期。除信仰因素外，出家的理由也千奇百怪：穷人为了有个地方吃住，富人为了长命百岁，体弱者为消灾去病，强壮者为福上加寿，婚前为婚后幸福要出家，婚后为重温婚前独身生活也要去做和尚。
总经理让我出家一星期
我到仰光的第二个星期，所在公司的缅甸总经理就让我先去拜塔。后来我才了解到，平时休息日，缅甸人就到住地附近的佛塔去拜塔。如果连着几天空闲，就一定会全家出动，带足干粮，到几百里外的佛塔去朝拜。而乘坐的车子上只要挂上“拜塔车”的牌子，就可以免去检查之烦，到哪里都畅通无阻。
我来到大金塔寺庙之后，总经理就让我在斜廊入口把鞋脱下来，然后让我赤脚沿斜廊拾级而上。进入塔院后，总经理又让我跟着他学，只见他从左向右围着塔拜，并诵经祈祷。过了一会儿，我准备离开时，他把我叫住，说让我先不要回公司，直接在仰光的金塔寺庙先出家一个星期。我一听，傻了眼，出家！总经理见我有些犹豫，又说这可以让我在此消灾解难，工作顺利。没办法，这可是我在此第一个任务！
出家那天，我被剃光了头，并被一位僧人带到一间宿舍，见过自己的师父。接下来几天，我开始接受了佛教育。每天我与其他师兄跟师父一起早早起床、坐禅；他给我们上课，传授佛教知识、修行的行持威仪、日常功课及祈祷祝愿等佛事。早上三点半起床去坐禅，晚上十点钟睡觉，坚持从晚上七点坐到十点，中午又坐一整中午，吃完午饭只有半小时的时间休息，又从中午十二点坐到下午两点，两点到四点是日常课诵，五点又要看长老说法的录像。时间安排得相当紧。在这里，我每天只能吃两餐，因为上座部佛教是提倡过午不食的。
我们每一位僧人在坐禅时一切行动都得慢，走路、吃饭、坐禅、拜佛等都是慢速度，有时，我一口饭最多要嚼二十几下，嘴都麻了。吃饭时寂静无声，连咀嚼的声音都不能听到。更为可贵可敬的是连那些只有七八岁的小沙弥都十分乖巧，各吃各的饭，没有一个人讲话，这一点让我感到很吃惊。
总经理见我问声好
记得出家第三天，缅甸总经理就来看我是否习惯。当他见到我时，居然给我磕头顶礼，还恭敬地说：“师傅，您好！”我当时吓呆了，轻轻地说了一声：“施主请起”。后来我才知道，缅甸人对僧侣十分尊敬，对僧侣讲话都用敬语，称谓一般都用专门词汇。僧侣们出门乘船坐车，人们都争相给他们让座。在城市里，僧侣们乘坐公交车都能受到免费的待遇。每逢庆典，最尊贵的座位总是让给僧侣来坐。任何人有事见僧侣，都须行跪拜礼，哪怕是亲生父母见到刚刚落发的亲生儿子，也要如此。在缅甸，国家领导人给僧侣跪拜行礼也是很平常的事。
缅甸的每个寺院，对要出家的人极为优待，寺院不会强行规定要你给多少钱，自己愿意给多少就给多少。临走那天，我向寺院捐了五百元，以示诚意。(曹诚龙)
September 28th, 2007 at 1:06 pm
标题:缅甸反政府游行 僧侣尼姑齐上街[组图]
缅甸反政府游行 僧侣尼姑齐上街[组图]
时间： 2007-09-24 11:03:30 来源： 中新网 【 打印 】 【 关闭 】
缅甸僧侣二十三日在仰光发起了二万人的游行，展开近二十年来向军政府作出的最大挑战。
民众对僧侣非常支持
在街头表达诉求的僧侣
缅甸上万名僧侣23日在仰光发起游行，向军政府挑战。首次有150名尼姑加入抗议。约一万名支持者跟随。一直被软禁在家的缅甸反对派领袖昂山素季周六公开露面，向连日来举行抗议示威的僧侣致意。缅甸的僧侣过去曾在反政府努力中发挥过关键作用。
受到22日前往会晤缅甸民主运动偶像昂山素姬的声势浩大游行鼓舞，在佛教僧侣率领下，23日大约有两万人冒雨在仰光市游行，对统治缅甸将近二十年的军政府构成历来最大规模挑战。
法新社报道，目击者表示，这批人从缅甸最重要地标修埃达贡寺（大金塔）出发，游行通过仰光街道，游行群众穿过市中心和绕行苏雷佛塔（小金塔）时，人数暴增。
大约一万名僧侣，其中许多人打赤脚游行，首次获身披浅粉红色外袍尼姑加入，约有一万名支持者尾随在后。游行的僧侣高呼：“我们希望民众加入我们的行列！”
约两百名抗议民众和僧侣高举的标语牌写着“热爱仁慈每次都能获胜”，他们试图如22日般接近昂山素姬的寓所，但却遭到阻挡。持盾牌的镇暴警察奉命封锁道路，多部消防车停放在附近待命，游行的僧侣最后被迫掉头离开。
约一百名女尼廿三日加入两千多位和尚在仰光「大金塔」的祈祷行列，然後游行前往仰光市中心。大金塔是缅甸最重要的佛教圣地。仰光廿三日有三场示威，参加者除一万名僧侣和一万名支持者外，还首度出现女尼。
缅甸僧侣在仰光街头示威。
以僧侣为首的两万多名示威者廿三日在第一大城仰光街头展开廿年来最大规模的游行示威，女尼也首度加入抗议行列。示威僧侣穿着暗红袈裟，女尼外衣则是粉红色，有如缅甸版「红衫军」。
二十三日较早时，约二十名支持军政府的武装者和配备盾牌的二十名防暴警察，堵住通往昂山素姬房子的道路，消防车也在旁戒备。僧侣最后转身离开。
围观者和支持者较早时拍着手挤满仰光市中心街道两旁，向僧侣送上清水和鲜花，又向僧侣的赤脚献上香油。
僧侣在仰光的游行活动二十三日进入第六天。当局虽然未有干预这天的游行，便衣警察却跟踪游行人士。部分警察还带备霰弹枪，守在游行路线的街角。
约三百名僧侣在离仰光商业心脏地带以北三百七十五公里的城镇马圭，举行一小时祈祷会。另有为数达五百人的僧侣加入中部城市曼德勒的一次抗议行列。
到目前为止，政府面对僧侣有纪律但被视为挑衅的抗议活动，态度极为谨慎，唯恐强迫阻止他们，有可能在以佛教为主要宗教的缅甸惹起公愤。
东盟秘书长王景荣二十三日则敦促东盟成员国缅甸的官员，避免采取“强硬行动”对付抗议活动。
22日，缅甸数千名佛教僧侣冒雨走上街头游行并祈祷，一直被软禁的昂山素姬从家中走出，含泪向游行僧侣致意。这是昂山素姬软禁四年来首次在公开场合露面。
据BBC报道，周六缅甸军政府容许游行的僧人途经昂山素姬的寓所，当近两千名僧人行至这位被软禁反对派领袖居所时，昂山素姬特意走到门前，向连日来举行抗议示威的僧侣致意。
抗议民众呼吁军政府释放昂山素姬僧侣在虔诚信仰佛教的缅甸极受敬重。BBC南亚事务记者海德说，缅甸领导人不愿意与公众普遍尊重的僧侣强硬对阵，担心会惹起民愤。但问题是，抗议者游行的时间拉得越长，缅甸政府就显得越软弱。
星期五，“缅甸佛教僧侣联盟”发表声明，直指军政府是“人民公敌”，呼吁举行和平示威，直至清除军事独裁。至此，僧侣成为这项在一个月前因物价大幅上涨而爆发，随后蔓延到全国的反对军政府的抗议活动的实际领导力量。
这是过去20年来缅甸发生的规模最大的抗议活动，也是军政府面临近二十年来最漫长的挑战。
分析家表示，自1962年起统治缅甸的军方，如今面临为难窘境。如果对备受敬重的僧侣展开暴力和公开镇压，势必会激怒缅甸民众和国际社会，袖手坐视又会暴露军政府的脆弱性。
东南亚国家联盟的负责人说，成员国正在尽一切努力，确保局势保持平和。缅甸是东盟成员国。美国国务卿赖斯说，缅甸民众有权享受自由，而且美国正在密切注视着形势的发展。
September 28th, 2007 at 1:17 pm
标题:缅甸僧侣抗议物价飞涨和腐败
缅甸僧侣要推翻军政府
新华网发展论坛
【我要评论】【该文章阅读量：13】【字号：大 中 小】
本周一，仰光再度发生佛教僧侣和尼姑的示威游行。据目击者报道，游行示威者已超过3万。游行大军由数千佛教僧侣和尼姑带领，旨在抗议物价攀升和该国的军政府统治。
此次游行活动是近20年来，缅甸民主运动遭到军方血腥镇压以来最大规模的一次。而带头抗议的是年轻的僧侣们。接连不断的游行活动使缅甸军政府深陷困境之中。若干军事观察家已预言，此次僧侣游行活动有可能导致军政府的垮台，缅甸军政府自1962年起对该国实行铁腕统治。
缅甸军政府陷于困境之中，因为缅甸的僧侣在这个以佛教徒为主的国家深受人们的爱戴和敬仰。一位流亡泰国的缅甸政治家在接受澳大利亚电台采访时表示，一旦缅甸安全力量对僧侣和尼姑诉诸武力，就有可能激起民愤，从而发动起义。“缅甸军政府难以使用暴力手段镇压僧侣的和平游行。如果他们这么做了，有可能会帮倒忙，因为这样一来，可能会在缅甸引发大规模的群众运动，重演1988年的一幕。”
1988年，缅甸军政府血腥镇压了当年大规模的民主运动。1990年，缅甸举行民主选举，在大选中，该国全国民主联盟明显获胜，但缅甸军政府拒绝承认选举结果。该国反对党领袖昂山素季遭到软禁，直到今天依旧如此。上周末，当游行队伍走过以往被安全力量封锁的昂山素季的住所时，这位诺贝尔和平奖得主走到门前，热泪盈眶，这是多年来，昂山素季首次公开露面。
据报章报道，由缅甸政府控制的佛教委员会要求僧侣返回寺庙。但本周一，不仅参加游行的僧侣和尼姑越来越多，还有越来越的居民也甘冒生命危险参加了游行行列。缅甸联邦民族委员会的索昂在电视中指出：“缅甸居民越来越勇敢地参加抗议活动。僧侣是该国最高的道德权威。如果僧侣能在游行活动中起带头作用，那么缅甸居民会逐渐加入这一行列的。”
此次游行示威的导火索是一个月前石油价格的攀升，由此带动了所有生活必需品的价格暴涨。但僧侣们抗议的已不在是油价飚升，他们已宣布，继续举行和平抗议活动直至彻底推翻该国军政府。
September 28th, 2007 at 2:51 pm
标题:China’s misguided ‘experts’ on the US
警惕投降主义在外交理论界的泛滥
作者：HMZ 文章来源：华岳论坛 点击数：489 更新时间：2007-5-8
《警惕投降主义在外交理论界的泛滥》
作者： HMZ(巴.县.黛.茶) [33975:3219], 00:36:50 1/16/2000:
警惕投降主义在外交理论界的泛滥
中国社会科学院美国研究所所长王缉思和国际关系学院院长助理
苏格是当前投降卖国派的两大理论标兵，是我国外交决策层中美
国利益和西方价值自觉或不自觉的追随者和维护者。他们以正统
学院派自居，以政治局中右倾投降势力为政治靠山，以实用主义
市侩哲学和庸俗的经济决定论为其思想武器，打着坚持和平外交
与经济发展的幌子，全面鼓吹投降附美的外交路线，以期把中国
的发展与崛起纳入美国的\"世界新秩序\"之中。
更为严重的是，他们在我国第四、第五代仕宦阶层中具有相当的
代表性。从思想根源上看，他们内心有着深刻的文化自卑和民族
自弃情结，对西方尤其是美国有着彻底和自觉的崇拜。然而身为
中国人的矛盾使得这种崇拜受血统认可与民族道义的压抑而得不
到宣泄，必然导致人格和情感的扭曲。因此他们从来就没有象毛
泽东时代的人们那样，尽管还没有摆脱贫穷与落後，可做一天中
国人就扬眉吐气一天，以藐视一切的精神与风度，充满自信地面
对所有新老强权。
王、苏所代表的一代在西方强权面前做人做得凄凄惨惨、悲悲戚
戚，早已在美国霸权主义的淫威下成为其精神奴隶。他们对中国
的政治前途感到茫然一片，而对美国人的政治理念和价值观有着
本质上的认同和接受，并认之为世界的归宗。说穿了，他们对西
方的政治训化和演变只是心服口不服罢了，原因是美国的态度太
粗暴了些，太不在乎这些\"开明\"人士的脸面，叫他们象新入风月
场女人，颇有些抹不开面子。若美国政界多由一些基辛格似的所
谓\"亲华人士\"出面、多给中国一些笑脸而不是无理指责，这批人
恐怕早就心服口服地与美国通力\"合作\"了。
这批人目前得到重用有历史的和现时政治两方面的原因。历史原
因在於邓小平。毛泽东的联美是出於抗俄的战略考虑，邓小平的
联美则完全出於经济考虑。这就不知不觉地将中美平等的战略利
用关系蜕变成中国对美国的依赖关系，而且没有在苏联解体、国
际政治格局发生根本改变之后，及时修改调整这种关系，致使中
国多年来一直处於被动局面，在政治、经济、外交等领域全面受
制於美国长达十年之久。邓小平的\"韬光养晦\"及\"不出头、不对
抗\"政策只是一种在思想上是主观的和一厢情愿的，在策略上又
是残缺和被动的无为应付，它完全没有估计到美国的侵略性和进
攻性，因此在美国的咄咄攻势面前，这一策略不幸成为投降主义
的\"总路线\"，而王、苏等人在许多关键场合下又正是这条总路线
最权威、最官方的诠释者。
从现时政治上看，第三代领导层中有这麽一种\"专美派\"，他们比
邓小平更进一步。他们的联美更是出於一种政治考虑，想依靠美
国及西方的力量和作用来推动中国的改革开放，於是与美国保持
良好关系就如同太阳、水和空气对於万物、乳汁对於婴儿那样的
重要，成为中国新生的保障。尽管他们的这一方针政策并没有在
政治上被表现得那样明目张胆，但在经贸和外交领域却被大张旗
鼓地推行。在\"专美派\"看来中美关系是至高无上的。国家的统一、
经济的发展都断不得美国的奶。几百万下岗职工气得，美国资本
家就是气不得；连批李登辉的两国论也非得张口一个克林顿打来
电话，闭口一个美国政府不承认。而当美国政府用五亿多美元的
军火支持两国论时，却只是喃喃地口称\"不理解\"，连抗议的话都
不敢说。可见，他们就是通过对美国的经济依赖达到对美国的政
治依赖、直至战略依赖，这恰恰和美国对华\"接触\"政策通过对华
经济制约达到政治制约、直至战略制约的设计殊途同归、异曲同
工。王、苏这样的有着专家身分和学术伪装的人士一方面因崇美
而受重用，充当起这些\"专美派\"外交政策的宣讲员，另一方面又
投\"专美派\"之所好，不断鼓噪迷人心志、混淆是非、误导视听的
谬论，成为投降政策和路线的忠实工具。
我们要警惕王缉思、苏格这类吹鼓手，更要警惕策用他们的实权
人物，他们更是国家的危害。刈除投降主义的毒草的关键在於铲
除右倾亲美的政治土壤；而清君侧的关键更在於正君身。
朱将军一席话也让王缉思这类老牌投降派坐卧不宁了
——————————————————————————–
作者: hmz(沈.郡.金.菊) [131984:4719], 18:08:34 07/18/2005:
- 论剑谈棋 豪杰尽聚 - 华岳论坛 - http://washeng.net/
王缉思曾经是江xx对美伙伴外交的设计师，在对美外交及台湾问题上，江xx
对他言听计从。于是95年的中美战略伙伴外交搞得有声有色，结果中国在外交和
台湾问题上却越来越被动，台独势力越来越嚣张，直至99年中国驻南使馆吃了克
林顿五颗导弹，王缉思这才悻悻退出一线，沉寂了几年。朱将军这番话肇事厉害
，我看最受用不了的倒是国内这批投降派和亲美人士。
我们且先不议论王缉思这个人，我以前的文章对他有过评论，单说王缉思所鼓吹
的这一套做法，即：中美要保持密切接触、尤其是军方的高层接触，中国要寄期
望于美国民主党和自由派人士，中国在关键时刻、尤其在危机时刻要冷静、说好
听的，不要用难听的话刺激美国等等，这些做法难道江泽民过去没有做到吗？江
泽民又何止说好听的，我们至今还在大笔大笔地买美国政府债券，与军火石油、
房地产财团一起在支撑着美国的经济，为美国的伊拉克战争和武力干涉全球计划
输送血液。但结果呢，也正如王缉思自己分析的，中国周边战略环境越来越局促
，美国对中国的围堵越来越实质化。日本近来违反常理的乖张难道不是美国对华
战略的体现？朱将军一席话敲山震虎，用美国人更容易接受和理解的语言表达我
们的关切，这难道不是中美军方保持密切接触一种方式吗？
说句客观的话，这些投降派人士与那些一心想致中国于死地的反中国和台独分子
不同，他们在主观上也许和我们一样，不希望的利益受到损失，但我们和王缉思
这批投降派之间的差别就在于他们眼中的美国是一条做“困兽斗”真老虎，而我
们眼中的美国是黔驴技穷、四面楚歌的纸老虎；他们习惯于对着美国的血盆大口
唱“Love me tender”（江xx97年访美时的即兴表演），而我们更喜欢象朱将
军那样来让美国人看清我们手中的打虎棒。
Henry 刘：胡锦涛找错了美国专家–王辑思
——————————————————————————–
作者: KMM(郑.埠.红.茶) [154715:43573], 16:35:22 05/04/2007:
- 论剑谈棋 豪杰尽聚 - 华岳论坛 - http://69.41.161.6/
China’’s misguided ‘’experts'’ on the US
By Henry C K Liu
(See also Part 1, Beyond Munich: Geostrategy and betrayal
and Part 2, Not much rise, and even less peace.)
Wang Jisi 王缉思, director of the Institute of American Studies, is known
in the West as China’’s foremost expert on the United States, called a
major \"America handler\" who is \"always giving guest
lectures in the US and very, very plugged-in with the senior leadership\".
Wang reportedly spent a whole day briefing Chinese President Hu Jintao
for his April 2006 US visit, which turned out to be a perfunctory summit
with no milestone diplomatic breakthroughs. It was obvious that Hu had
not been adequately warned by his expert about not-so-latent US hostility.
The most memorable moment of the summit was a televised heckling by a
Falungong fanatic during the official welcoming ceremony on the White
House lawn. Many Chinese think that the heckling was deliberately staged
by anti-China forces to embarrass publicly the leader of the world’’s most
populous nation, Wang Jisi’’s well-known upbeat views of US friendship
notwithstanding.
Wang, dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University
and director of the Institute of International Strategic Studies at the
Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party, also had an article
published in the September/October 2005 issue of Foreign Affairs to set
a positive tone for Hu’’s US visit, with the title \"China’’s search for
stability with America\".
The article is an expanded and revised version of one originally published
in Zhongguo Dangzheng Ganbu Luntan, a journal of the Central Party School.
Thus its views are not merely diplomatic spin designed to persuade a skeptical
US audience before a difficult summit.
In his article, Wang argues for the need of China to maintain friendly
relations with the United States, as the US is expected to remain a superpower
for a long time. Wang reasons that \"only a US economic decline would reduce
Washington’’s strength (including its military muscle) and ease the strategic
pressure on Beijing. Such a slide, however, would also harm China’’s economy.
In addition, the increased US sense of insecurity that might result could
have other consequences that would not necessarily benefit China. If,
for example, Washington’’s influence in the Middle East diminished, this
could lead to instability there that might threaten China’’s oil supplies.
Similarly, increased religious fundamentalism and terrorism in Central
and South Asia could threaten China’’s own security, especially along its
western borders, where ethnic relations have become tense and separatist
tendencies remain a danger.\"
This view of power geopolitics is deficient in analytical clarity, evensed on that country’’ssed on US power. It can onlysed on a relationship of mutual respect and equality, and a commitment
simple logic, let alone ideological correctness, and is contradictory
to China’’s long-standing policy of rejecting power geopolitics. The need
for friendly relations with another country is not ba
economic and military strength, but on its peaceful attitude and just
policies. US-China friendship cannot be ba
be ba
to peaceful co-existence.
Because of the already massive foreign-exchange reserves held by China,jections from the now excessively influential export sector.
a slowdown of the US economy would not cause an unmanageable financial
crisis for China. If it shifts its economy toward domestic development
rather than continuing to rely excessively on export for US dollars, an
economic decline in the United States would have only minor effect on
the Chinese economy. In fact, it may well be the necessary medicine to
force China to shift toward domestic development over obstinate special-interest
ob
Further, it is pure self-deception to think that Chinese economic policy
can exert any fundamental effect on the US economy, which in 2006 was
still 10 times as large in gross domestic product (US$13 trillion) than
the Chinese economy ($1.3 trillion). Total US-China trade in 2006 was
$323 billion, behind US-Canada trade of $533 billion and almost the same
as US-Mexico trade of $332 billion.
Recurring financial crises are structural for financial globalizationsed on dollar hegemony. Such
under a dysfunctional finance architecture ba
financial crises allow the printer of dollars regularly to rob exporting
nations of their financial gains earned with low wages. China can only
be a victim, never the instigator, of such crises because it cannot print
US dollars. US economic decline will be the result of flawed US policy
and nothing else.
China’’s need for Middle Eastern oil is not threatened by US withdrawal
from the region, as big producers such as Saudi Arabia and small Persian
Gulf states as well as Iran are independently shifting the oil trade to
China away from the United States. It’’s a toss-up between continuing US
presence and withdrawal as to which would cause more stability in the
Middle East.
While China has no incentive or even the power to force a US withdrawal
from the Middle East, it can add its voice and influence to urge the US
to adopt a more balanced Middle East policy. It is not necessary for Beijing
blindly to support US policy in the region because of China’’s need for
oil. In fact the reverse is true: China will put its oil supply in jeopardy
by aligning too closely with flawed US policy on the Middle East.
As for threats from terrorism, China faces terrorist threats from separatist
political grievances, quite different from the US, which faces terrorist
threats from Islamic extremism out of religious conflicts and anti-imperialist
grievances. In fact, China cannot possibly hope to solve its own unique
terrorism problem by siding with the controversial US \"war on terrorism\".
Quite the opposite - a US-China alliance on global terrorism will add
unneeded and unwanted complexity to the single-dimensional terrorist threats
faced by China today.
While terrorism-fighting technology shares universality, the socio-political
causes behind terrorism are unique in every nation,
making international cooperation in any \"global war on terrorism\" highly
problematic. Until September 11, 2001, the US was an open sponsor of separatist
terrorism against China.
Long-term US belligerence against Chinased anti-Chinese legislation in US history.
Wang writes that \"history has already proved that the United States is
not China’’s permanent enemy\". Such a claim is contrary to fact. The US
considers all communist governments permanent enemies. US hostility toward
China is both racial and ideological, with the racial side running back
two centuries to the founding of the US as an independent nation and the
ideological side beginning with the founding of the People’’s Republic
of China. This hostility is not limited to nation-state geopolitics. Its
missionary roots go to a deep-seated public attitude that remains ready
for demagogue politicians to exploit at any time. There is a big archive
of racially ba
A recent survey by WorldPublicOpinion.org (WPO) on \"US General Attitudes
Towards China\" found that \"Americans lean toward negative views of China’’s
role in the world, its government, economic system, leadership, and its
human-rights record. There is little optimism that the human-rights record
will improve or that China will become more democratic. Trust in China
is fairly low.\"
Between January 2005 and April 2006, BBC/GlobeScan/PIPA and WPO askedsed on perceptions
Americans on three occasions whether China was having a mostly positive
or mostly negative influence in the world. In each case a slight majority
or plurality said it was having a negative influence - January 2005 (46%),
November 2005 (53%), and April 2006 (49%). Furthermore, three out of four
Americans have an unfavorable view of \"how China uses military power and
the threat of force\". Notwithstanding that this attitude is ba
misled by US propaganda, not on historical facts, public opinion translates
directly into votes that affect official policy in the US political system.
Attitudes about the Chinese government and economic system are also quite
unfavorable. In the April 2006 WPO poll, 80% said they had an unfavorable
opinion of China’’s system of government (40% very unfavorable), while
66% had an unfavorable view of China’’s economic system.
President Hu also gets low approval ratings from Americans. Sixty-three
percent have an unfavorable view of Hu, while just 27% have a favorable
view of the Chinese leader. Attitudes about Hu are also more unfavorable
than those of Russian President Vladimir Putin, a former high KGB officer,
who was rated in the same poll.
Asked in April 2006 whether China had become more or less \"democratic
and responsive to its people\", only 24% said it had become more democratic,
while 49% believed it had \"stayed about the same\" and 18% said it had
gotten less democratic. In the past, several Pew studies consistently
found that a majority of Americans did not believe \"China’’s government
is becoming more democratic and is allowing more freedoms for Chinese
citizens\". In May 2001, 62% expressed this view. Skepticism about China’’s
progress toward democracy is closely related to greater doubts about improvements
in its human-rights practices.
Americans are also skeptical about China’’s movement toward the free-market
system. In the May 2001 Pew poll, a 47% plurality said they did not believe
\"China’’s economy is becoming more like the kind of free-market system
found the United States\". This was virtually unchanged from early 1999.
Americans have also shown pessimism about US policies influencing China
to change, and about China and the US finding common ground. In a May
2001 Pew survey, a majority (56%) said they did not think it \"possible
for the US, through its policies, to have much of an effect on making
China more democratic\". When asked in a March 1999 Louis Harris poll if
\"the US and China will be able to work together to adopt the same common
values about democracy and a market economy\", just 29% thought that would
happen. Nearly two-thirds (65%) rejected the possibility.
Trust in China continues to be fairly low. In February 2006 in the midst
of the controversy over the management of US seaports by foreign companies,
respondents were asked whether companies from different countries should
be allowed to own cargo operations at US seaports. A majority (65%) believed
that companies from China or Hong Kong should not be allowed to own these
operations, more than those who opposed ownership by companies from Arab
countries friendly to the US (56% should not) and France (50% should not).
In a January 2000 Hart Research poll, nearly half (48%) said that \"compared
with other countries that the US trades with\", China was seen as below
average in \"living up to the agreements it makes with the United States\".
Just 32% thought China was average (25%) or above average (7%) in this
regard.
Americans are more apt to view the US-China relationship as unfriendly
rather than friendly, but only a small minority view China as an outright
enemy. Americans are divided as to whether China is cooperating with the
US in the \"war on terrorism\". A strong majority view relations with China
as being important to US interests and growing more important, though
problems posed by China are not considered pressing. While China is not
viewed directly as an enemy of the United States, perceptions of its foreign-policy
influence on the US are predominantly negative. Asked in April 2006 about
how they view \"the effect of Chinese foreign policy on the United States
and its interests\", a majority - 54% - said it had been very or somewhat
negative, while only 36% said it had been positive.
For decades, Harris polls have asked whether Americans think China is
\"an ally of the US, is friendly but not an ally, is not
friendly but not an enemy, or is unfriendly and is an enemy of the US\".
Gallup, the Los Angeles Times, CBS (Columbia Broadcasting System) News
and others have used similar questions. Over the past few years, with
just a few exceptions, a plurality to fairly strong majority has said
that China is either \"not friendly\" or an enemy. Recently (August 2005)
Harris found 53% saying China was either \"not friendly, but not an enemy\"
(38%) or \"unfriendly and
When forced to choose between just two options of characterizing China
- as either an adversary or an ally - a strong majority chooses \"adversary\".
As recently as July 2005, an NBC/Wall Street Journal poll found 49% thought
of China as more of an adversary \"in general\", while just 26% saw it as
more of an ally. The poll found that about three in four considered China
to be \"an adversary and competitor\" on \"diplomatic and military issues\"
(77%) as well as \"economic issues\" (73%). When asked in a May 1999 Pew
poll, 51% disagreed with the assertion that \"China is basically friendly
toward the United States\". Thus when President George W Bush characterized
China as a \"strategic competitor\", he was voicing US public opinion.
Of course, how the US public thinks of China does not reflect an accuratesed on ignorance, because in politics,
picture of what China actually is. It only reflects attitude. Yet it is
not useful to dismiss such opinion as ba
perception is all. US public opinion does influence policy by determining
the composition of the government. Wang Jisi, as China’’s foremost expert
on the US, would do well to pay close attention to such public opinion
polls to avoid being misled by propaganda from his expert counterparts
in US think-tanks.
Wang also writes: \"Nor does China want the United States to see it as
a foe.\" Unfortunately, what China wants of the US is not what the US government
will automatically grant or even be in a position to grant without public
support. The US will continue to see China as a foe as long as public
opinion on China remains predominantly negative. To improve relations
between the two countries, more than strategic dialogues between experts
and policymakers are needed. Transparent spins by official experts are
close to useless.
What China needs to do, as Japan has successfully done since the end of
World War II, is invest heavily in people-to-people contacts and exchanges
with the US public, increase support for educational and cultural exchanges,
and promote a network of non-governmental, non-commercial friendship organizations
in every state in the US to give the public a better understanding of
China. For example, while there are frequent exchanges of trade delegations,
there are as yet no \"Year of China\" events in the US, as there were in
France in 2003-04 and in Russia now.
Insular experts
Experts like Wang Jisi usually spend a couple years at prestigious US
universities as pampered foreign VIP scholars and are spoon-fed well-rehearsed
academic spins by their hosts, whose perspective on China is often detached
from US mass opinion. Exchange scholars from China are frequently cocooned
in an insulated environment of respect and friendship from their US colleagues,
never having a chance to experience personally and directly the reality
of racial discrimination and ideological intolerance in US society. The
positive perception of the United States these experts carry home with
them is distorted by their insular experience. This explains why while
China can interact effectively with the executive branch of the US government,
it does not have a good understanding of the raw political dynamics that
drive Congress.
These US-trained Chinese scholars then return home as experts on the US
to act as high-level advisers to the Chinese leadership. Their understanding
of the US is often superficial and elitist, limited by the rules of discourse
prevalent in US universities and policy think-tanks they visited. Policy
experts are a tight little fraternity, and they tend to represent the
official views of their respective governments. They communicate through
formal dialogue of high-sounding policy and diplomatic jargon to seek
convergence through the choreography of foreign-policy negotiation. Together,
these experts fashion agreements that cannot be implemented by the contracting
governments because the agreements they make are often unrelated to reality
on the ground or the domestic political weather in either country.
In democratic politics, the lowest common denominator frequently carries
the day into policy. For the United States, that lowest common denominator
is decidedly anti-China. For China, the lowest common denominator is a
fantasy on natural US amity, a common defect of Chinese national narcissism.
Elitist Chinese experts on the US like Wang Jisi would improve their understanding
of the US by heeding the advice of Mao Zedong to stay close to the voice
of the people.
Hostility no secret
As for Wang’’s claim that \"history has already proved that the United States
is not China’’s permanent enemy\", one can only surmise that Wang is unfamiliar
with the views of Aaron L Friedberg, a professor of politics and international
affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, who joined
US Vice President Dick Cheney’’s staff as a deputy national security adviser
and director of policy planning on June 1, 2003, for a term of one year,
taking a public-service leave from the WWS.
The appointment caused widespread speculation about neo-conservative co-option
of US foreign policy in general and China policy in particular. It is
noteworthy that the appointment of Friedberg occurred almost two years
after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, and two months after
\"catastrophic victory\" in Iraq, after which US-China relations were supposedly
improved by US attention on a more pressing enemy.
In an article in the November 2000 issue of Commentary, an
influential neo-conservative monthly, titled \"The struggle for mastery
in Asia\", Friedberg put forth the proposition that \"the United States
will find itself engaged in an open and intense geopolitical rivalry with
the People’’s Republic of China\", and that \"there are reasons to believe
it is already under way\". This article was written at the time of the
presidential election of 2000, and the victory of George W Bush since
has given it policy significance. While the article was written almost
a year before the attacks of September 2001, the US response to which
has affected its subsequent tactical posture toward China, the neo-conservative
theme of China being a strategic competitor to US hegemony remains operative
for long-range policy. Friedberg’’s appointment to Cheney’’s staff after
the second war in Iraq as deputy national security adviser and director
of policy planning reinforced this view.
Friedberg’’s proposition is based on his openly stated assumption that
the US, while seeking to satisfy China’’s legitimate ambitions, will not
be willing to abandon its own present position of preponderance in Asia
or to surrender \"pride of place\" to China. To permit a potentially hostile
power to dominate East Asia would not only be out of line with current
US policy, it would mark a deviation from the fundamental pattern of the
US grand strategy since at least the latter part of the 19th century.
These are the necessary preconditions of a \"struggle for mastery\" in Asia,
Friedberg concludes. Wang would do well to temper his complacency about
\"the US not being China’’s permanent enemy\" by paying attention to the
likes of Friedberg.
Robert Dreyfuss, in his article \"Vice Squad\" about the Office of the Vice
President in The American Prospect, lists Cheney’’s leading China specialist,
Stephen Yates, and several other key staffers as having worked for California
congressman Christopher Cox in the 1990s during the congressional investigation
into Chinese political influence in the US that followed allegations of
Beijing’’s contributions to the presidential campaign of Bill Clinton and
Al Gore.
The long resultant report characterizes China as a looming threat and
rival, with rapacious need for Middle East oil and \"designs\" on Taiwan.
Charles W Freeman, a former US ambassador to China who has known Yates
many years says that Yates, as well as neo-cons Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas
Feith, formerly top officials in Donald Rumsfeld’’s Defense Department,
all see China as the solution to a US \"enemy-deprivation syndrome\".
Dreyfuss'’ article suggests that the Cheney-dominated Bush administrationses
sees China as the most serious long-term threat to US global interests.
If conflict with China is inevitable, then the United States needs ba
in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Iraq and maybe even Iran and Syria. If China
is dependent on Middle East oil, then the US must be able to control how
and where the oil flows from the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf oilfields.
To contain China, the US needs to cultivate an alliance with India, evennking North Korea to Iran and Iraq as \"an axis
risking the accusation of nuclear hypocrisy in doing so. It is in US interests
to reverse the policies of former president Clinton, raise tension on
the Korean Peninsula by li
of evil\", dismissing South Korea’’s \"Sunshine diplomacy\" efforts and encouraging
Japan to take a hard line toward Pyongyang. The Bush administration managed
to get Tokyo to declare, for the first time in history, that the security
of the Taiwan Strait is of common concern to Japan and the United States.
In the name of the \"war on terror\", the US has regained a strategic toehold
in the Philippines to malign the growing Filipino Maoist movement.
The Cheney neo-cons have a vision of a new transformed world order built
on two pillars: (1) a new \"democratic\" Middle East and (2) a long-range
containment of China even if it should turn capitalist. The Middle East
vision since the invasion of Iraq has fallen apart, but the long-range
containment of China may well be the redeeming war cry that will save
this flawed vision. The neo-con anti-China cancer is now in remission,
but far from being cured. Reforming and containing China is the one long-term
issue that US Republicans and Democrats agree on, despite nuances of partisan
politics, with each party operating with a separate agenda.
The June 2005 issue of The Atlantic Monthly featured Robert D Kaplan’’snk China and the United States in a future [conflict] that may
\"How we would fight China: The next cold war\", as an inevitable war that
\"will li
stretch over several generations\". By comparison, \"the Middle East is
just a blip\", according to Kaplan. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman,
author of The World Is Flat, calls Kaplan among the \"most widely read\"
authors defining the post-Cold War world, along with Francis Fukuyama
of The End of History and the Last Man and Samuel P Huntington of The
Clash of Civilizations. Huntington fantasizes of an \"Islamic-Confucian
world\" in Eurasia, from the Middle East to China, as \"an arc of crisis\"
overrun by evil enemies in an \"Islamic-Sinic alliances\" that must be tamed
by the good forces of the West, and prophesied that a war between the
US and China will break out by 2010, centering on the oil lanes of the
South China Sea. Huntington’’s timing may be off, but his message is loud
and clear to the US informed public.
Thomas Donnelly, a senior fellow at the Project for the New American Century
(PNAC), a member of the China Economic and Security Review Commission
from February 10, 2005, to December 31, 2006, wrote in an article in the
May 2003 issue of the American Enterprise Institute’’s National Security
Outlook that the US needed to use its then-two-month-old victory in the
Iraq war to keep and enlarge Pax Americana and further institutionalize
superpower unipolarity by \"rolling back\" radical Islamism while \"containing\"
the People’’s Republic of China, that is, \"hedging against its rise to
great-power status\". While this view has since been tempered by US \"catastrophic
success\" in war turning unexpectedly into unmitigated failure in peace
in Iraq, the strategic design on containing China remains unaltered.
Not all in the United States are warmongering fanatics, but even
pacifists recognize US belligerence toward China. Joseph Gerson of theses and forward deployments,
American Friends Service Committee, a pacifist Quakers group committed
to the principles of non-violence and justice and recipient of the 1947
Nobel Peace Prize, warned in \"US Asia-Pacific Hegemony and Possibilities
of Popular Solidarity\" delivered at a conference in Seoul in June 1999:
\"In the Asia-Pacific region, the US is enforcing its 21st-century ‘’Open
Door'’ policy by means of the IMF [International Monetary Fund], the World
Bank, APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation], ba
the 7th Fleet and its nuclear arsenal; as it seeks to simultaneously contain
and engage China, to dominate the sea lanes and straits through which
the region’’s trade and supplies of oil must travel (the ‘’jugular vein'’
of Asia-Pacific economies), and to ‘’cap'’ Japanese militarism and nationalism.\"
How deep does Wang Jisi have to bury his head in the sand not to hear
these loud predictions of inevitable war between the US and China?
Chinese naivety on US
A review of Wang’’s published work on his understanding of US political
culture shows that Chinese leaders are as much victims of their experts
on the US as US leaders are of their experts on China. It explains why
the two nations interact like ships passing each other in the night.
For example, in a December 10, 2003, article in The Study Times (Xuexi
Shibao) titled \"The logic of the American hegemony\", Wang, as director
of the Institute of the American Studies in the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, wrote in the lead sentence: \"The development and changes of
America’’s domestic democracy have strengthened the status of the United
States as a hegemon, and have also enriched its hegemonic thoughts.\" He
followed up by an analysis of US race and diversity politics and its relationship
to US hegemonic foreign policy.
But Wang’’s analysis of racism in US politics is naively conventional,
showing a lack of deep understanding beyond that touted by the US mainstream
media. In fact, US moral imperialism has not risen from its civil-rights
achievements or its commitment to racial and ethnic diversity as Wang
claims. Rather, the age of US moral imperialism coincides with a period
of backsliding in domestic progress on these issues.
Wang cites Henry Kissinger, Zbignew Brzezinski, Madeleine Albright and
Colin Powell as evidence of US diversity. Yet anyone familiar with US
sociological development knows that minority members frequently complain
about tokenism, with the observation that \"these prominent appointees
only look like us; they don'’t think like us or speak for us\". To this
day, for a minority member to succeed in the US, he or she must purge
a deep-rooted minority mentality.
There is a well-known joke that when US-born Israeli prime minister Golda
Meir tried to persuade Henry Kissinger, a Jewish American, to make Israel
a top priority in US Mideast policy, he reportedly sent her a note: \"I
would like to inform you that I'’m first an American citizen; second, US
secretary of state; and third, a Jew,\" to which she responded, \"In Israel,
we read from right to left.\" During Kissinger’’s shuttle diplomacy between
Egypt and Israel, he was often met by Meir at the airport. One time, after
being kissed by Kissinger, Meir quipped in front of television: \"I didn'’t
know you kiss women also,\" in a good-natured reference to Kissinger’’s
alleged pro-Arab stance.
The current US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, is a visible case
in point. Almost a year before Wang wrote his article, the Washington
Post on January 18, 2003, credited Rice, a black woman who was then national
security adviser, with taking a key role in helping to shape the Bush
administration’’s decision to challenge the affirmative-action admissions
policy at the University of Michigan, a position widely regarded as anti-minority
and anti-diversity.
Blitzkrieg foreign policy
Wang writes:
The Americans were forced to withdraw from Vietnam in 1973, ultimately
leading to a defeat that has brought tremendous shame and humiliation
to the American nation. The end of the Vietnam War was primarily a consequence
of international factors, but the anti-war movement in the backdrop of
the civil-rights movement was also a major reason why president [Lyndon]
Johnson declined to run for re-election and why the Nixon administration
decided to withdraw the US forces from Vietnam. [President Richard] Nixon
once helplessly remarked, ‘’The Vietnam War was not lost in the battlefields
in Vietnam, but in the halls of the Congress, in the offices of major
newspapers and television editors, and in the classrooms of outstanding
universities and colleges.'’ Indeed, at the time when Nixon made these
remarks, he still had power to continue this war, but he had lost the
political basis and moral authority for doing so.If Wang had done his research,
he would have found out from publicly available declassified documents
that by 1973 the United States had already accepted defeated in Vietnam.
The Tet Offensive between January and June 1968 was the turning point
that forced the US to recognize that the war could not be won strategically,
even though the offensive itself was a tactical defeat for the Viet Cong.
In the 1968 US presidential campaign, candidate Nixon asserted in virtually
every speech that the goal of his administration would be to \"end the
war and win the peace in Vietnam\". Nixon worked to withdraw from Vietnam
soon after he entered the White House on January 20, 1969, as part of
his policy of detente with the Soviet Union and opening to China. He faced
a divided nation and had to resist the left, which wanted an immediate
withdrawal, as well as the right, which wanted a further escalation of
the war. The remark quoted by Wang above was only Nixon’’s maneuver to
assign blame for the Vietnam defeat conveniently to war protesters at
home.
The historical fact was that the US had realized by the time Johnson refused
to face a second-term election in 1968 that the war was lost and the problem
was how to withdraw gracefully from an unwinnable quagmire against the
forces of Vietnamese national liberation. If the war had been successful
on the ground, no amount of domestic protest would have been able to stop
it short of total victory. It was the same trick as the post-1949 Republican
charge of \"who lost China\" on the Democrats, as if China was the United
States'’ to lose. China came under communism because of an unstoppable
historical current, not because the US State Department was infested with
disloyal communists, as senator Joe McCarthy claimed.
Again, Wang wrote:
In September 2002, the US National Security Strategy Report announced
the \"preemptive strike\" strategy, causing strong criticisms from many
countries. But if the US decides to launch a preemptive strike against
another country, it has to issue a public military threat to that country
before the actual strike takes place; only then will the US take advantage
of the crisis, setting the bottom lines of concessions, creating waves
of propaganda domestically and abroad, and consulting its allies.
The US will not launch Blitzkriegs as [was done] during the invasion of
Poland by Nazi Germany, Japan’’s attacks on Pearl Harbor, the 1968 Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Yet this does not by any means demonstrate the \"goodwill\" of the American
hegemony. Instead, it tells us that the complexity of the US decision-making
process provides our countries with opportunities to figure out responses
to the crisis, and to find out ways to influence the US decision-making
process lest the situation gets totally out of control.The historical facts
of the German invasion of Poland, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
Hawaii, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan are at variance with what Wang presents. The German invasion
of Poland began on September 1, 1939, one week after the signing of the
secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which came into being as a result of Western
maneuvers at Munich a year earlier, giving plenty of time to prepare for
war or to defuse it.
British historian A J P Taylor’’s The Origins of the Second World War,
written between 1957 and 1961, challenged the then-accepted view that
Adolf Hitler had been a uniquely evil plotter of war by presenting a view
of Hitler as an opportunist who had enjoyed much popular support in Germany
and Austria. Hitler pushed for reform of the Versailles Treaty to secure
concessions that would placate Germanic sentiment. The unraveling of the
absurdities of the Versailles Treaty could have been managed rationally,
as in the early stages of British and French appeasement over the Rhineland
and Germany’’s Anschluss of Austria. After Munich, in 1938, having appeased
Berlin on more contestable territorial issues over the Sudetenland, the
British changed their stance because of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and
decided to fight over Danzig (now Gdansk) and the Polish Corridor, where
the German case for revision was stronger than in Czechoslovakia. Britain
and France had up to that point vacillated between policies of appeasement
and resistance, hoping to turn Germany east against the USSR.
The result, Taylor maintained, was a war in Europe that nobody wanted
and that personally dismayed Hitler. The European phase of World War II
began simply as an unintended accident of miscalculation. Hitler never
imagined that the European democracies would actually go to war over Poland,
especially because London and Paris could do almost nothing to defend
the Poles. And in 1773, Poland had been the first nation in the European
system to be partitioned out of existence without a war, a source of great
satisfaction to the participating powers: Russia, Austria and Prussia.
In 1966, Czechoslovakia, following the lead of Romania, rejected the Soviet
Union’’s call for more military integration within the Warsaw Pact and
sought greater input in planning and strategy for the pact’’s non-Soviet
members. At the same time, plans to effect great structural changes in
Czechoslovak military organizations were under discussion. All these debates
heated up in 1968 during the Prague Spring of political liberalization
when CSLA (Ceskoslovenska Lidova Armada, or Czechoslovak People’’s Army)
commanders put forward plans to democratize the armed forces, limiting
the role of the Communist Party.
National military doctrine became an issue with the release of two importantse its defense strategy on its own geopolitical interests and
documents: the Action Program of the Ministry of Defense and the Memorandum
of the Klement Gottwald Military Political Academy, stating that Czechoslovakia
should ba
that the threat from the West had been overstated. Although the regime
of Alexander Dubcek was careful to reassure the Soviet Union that Czechoslovakia
would remain committed to the Warsaw Pact, Mos禽 felt challenged by these
developments, which undoubtedly played a major role in the final decision
to invade in August 1968.
Wang confuses Blitzkrieg, a war-prosecuting doctrine, with the general
prewar buildup of political tensions that lead finally to war. US military
doctrine since Vietnam has been all Blitzkrieg with overwhelming force
to end the fighting within weeks, as in the two US-led wars with Iraq.
War preparation by the US military is a continuing undertaking to achieve
continuous readiness, with war-inducing political scenarios projected
years in advance and war games played repeatedly to prepare for actions
years in the future. It is part of the post-World War II Cold War strategy
of the militarization of the peace. There is no reason to expect that
US military action against China will be different when it comes.
Warmaking power in the US government has shifted entirely to the White
House since the end of World War II, after which all US wars have been
undeclared wars launched by executive authority, with congressional input
only after the fact. The political tension that can lead to war can fluctuate
for decades while never totally dissipating entirely. But when the shooting
starts, it will be by Blitzkrieg tactics, because no military wants a
long-drawn-out war. The US and China are currently playing out a game
of war or peace through strategic dialogues. The key to deterring an unwanted
US war against China will be to convince the US that such a war will not
end quickly.
Neo-conservative ‘’moral clarity'’
Again, Wang writes: \"Due to the diversity in politics, culture, and religion,
the US government has no way of monopolizing moral resources. It cannot
proclaim itself as the ultimate judge of justice.\"
How then did the hijacking of US foreign policy by the Bush neo-cons with
their \"moral clarity\" come to pass? Bush’’s \"transformationalist\" agenda
was embraced by then-national security adviser Rice, who in August 2003
set out US ambitions to remake the Middle East along neo-conservatives
lines by using military power to advance democracy and free markets. It
is a policy for political transformation of Arab society deemed vital
to victory in the \"war on terrorism\". The US long ago rejected cultural
relativism in favor of moral imperialism. That has been the ideological
foundation of the neo-conservative PNAC, which declares a fundamental
challenge in its Statement of Principles: \"To shape a new century favorable
to American principles and interests.\"
The signers of the PNAC Statement - Elliott Abrams, Gary Bauer, William
J Bennett, Jeb Bush, Dick Cheney, Eliot A Cohen, Midge Decter, Paula Dobriansky,
Steve Forbes, Aaron Friedberg, Francis Fukuyama, Frank Gaffney, Fred C
Ikle, Donald Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad, I Lewis Libby, Norman Podhoretz,
Dan Quayle, Peter W Rodman, Stephen P Rosen, Henry S Rowen, Donald Rumsfeld,
Vin Weber, George Weigel and Paul Wolfowitz, all luminaries of the US
political right - sought \"to accept responsibility for America’’s unique
role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our
security, our prosperity, and our principles
With such naive views as those held by Wang Jisi passing as sound analysis
by China’’s foremost expert on the US, the Chinese leadership will be hard
put to make intelligent decisions on US-China relations.
The coalition of neo-cons and neo-liberals in US foreign policy and economic
agenda does not just want to prevent China from achieving the reincorporation
of Taiwan. The coalition does not just want full opening of Chinese markets
to complete neo-liberal globalization. It does not just want to impose
US democratic values in China. It wants to \"preserve and extend an international
order friendly to US security, US prosperity, and US principles through
military strength and moral clarity\", with proxy regimes led by native
comprador capitalists who will gain power through bourgeois democracy
financed by US dollars.
This is the US transformation strategy of regime change, by peaceful means
if possible, by force if necessary. The United States has set itself up
as a global monopoly of justice, with the right to act as judge, jury
and executioner by virtue of its superior moral values.
Wang writes that China \"must maintain a close relationship with the United
States if its modernization efforts are to succeed
A more convincing case can be made that China should maintain a correct
and non-confrontational relationship with the United States while building
friendly cooperative relationships with all peaceful nations of the world.
Until the US abandons its role as a superpower hegemon, stops interfering
in China’’s internal affairs on the issue of Taiwan and ceases and desists
in its aggressive push to transform China’’s socialist system into market
capitalism, a close relationship with the US at the expense of Chinese
independence is not in China’’s national interest, nor is it appropriate
for the world’’s most populous nation with one of the longest continuous
histories to support an exploitative US empire. China should not accept
a \"cooperative partnership\" with the US in its strategy of turning China
again into a semi-colony by neo-imperialism.
China can reach its goal of developing itself once again as a benevolent
great power worthy of the spirit of its people, culture and history without
depending on any one foreign nation. There is no need to rely on the \"cooperation\"
of a United States whose policy aims at a \"struggle for mastery\" in Asia.
Such a policy is by definition imperialistic, as the US is only a Pacific
power by geography, and not an Asian power by either geography or culture.
The US has the capacity to be a great nation that can contribute to the
peaceful development of a just world order. Unfortunately, the peaceful
forces in US society have been largely marginalized in US politics, a
process that began with Theodore Roosevelt’’s Manifest Destiny imperialism,
reversed during the New Deal era under Franklin D Roosevelt and revived
during the witch-hunts of the McCarthy era and subsequent Cold War hysteria.
The rise of neo-liberal fundamentalism in the Ronald Reagan era has since
legitimized greed and exploitation. China would do well for itself and
for world peace to re-establish cooperative contacts with these peaceful
forces in US politics.
China’’s economic relations with the United States are heavily tilted toward
catering to capital and management, granting visiting executives of US
transnational corporations the protocol equivalent of visiting heads of
state. The result is that US labor, both unionized and independent, has
become passionately anti-China. Until China improves its relationship
with and understanding of US labor through direct dialogue and solidarity,
a trade war of protectionism between the two economies is unavoidable.
The Chinese government, since the establishment of diplomatic relations
with the United States, has unceremoniously jettisoned many US non-governmental
organizations that promoted friendship with China during the long Cold
War decades of official US hostility toward China. The government has
pursued shortsighted power politics by catering only to those currently
in power in the US and ignoring longtime friends and supporters. Such
behavior is unbecoming for a culture rooted in Confucian ethics. It is
also the reason China scores so negatively in US public opinion.
Exchanges of scholars and experts in the past decade have been mostly
reserved for neo-liberals and right-of-center ideologues who basically
see socialist China as a terminal case. As a result, China has no true
friends and supporters in the US body politic or among the general public,
only fair-weather opportunists in finance and business, and missionaries
with transparent agendas in politics and government. Until China begins
to rebuild grassroots friendship and support among the American people,
there will be no sustainable harmony in US-China relations.
By favoring enemies and neglecting friends, one seldom ends up with more
friends.
This is the concluding article of this report.
Henry C K Liu is chairman of a New York-based private investment group.
His website is at www.henryckliu.com.
(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact
us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
September 28th, 2007 at 8:21 pm
标题:我国严查《妓女日记》等色情小说
我国严查《妓女日记》等色情小说
中新社北京九月二十八日电 (记者 孙自法)中国全国“扫黄打非”工作小组办公室二十八日向媒体发布信息说，针对一些境内网站登载《妓女日记》网络淫秽色情小说的情况，新闻出版总署和该办公室近日联合发出紧急通知，要求各地新闻出版、“扫黄打非”部门出重拳严查严打《妓女日记》等网络淫秽色情小说。
官方要求各地 “扫黄打非”和新闻出版部门抓好四个方面工作：
一是责令辖区内登载《妓女日记》网络淫秽色情小说的网站立即将其内容全部删除，同时通知辖区内涉及网络出版的网站，不得登载、链接、传播、炒作相关信息；
二是提请当地通信管理等有关部门协助，及时对上述淫秽色情内容进行删除，对未按要求删除相关信息的网站，要依据有关规定，对其非法从事网络出版的行为给予行政处罚，对变换地址逃避监管的网站，要及时跟踪搜索，依法从严查处，必要时，将情节严重网站的有关情况通报当地公安、电信管理部门，依法关闭其网站；
三是要求辖区内刊有网络出版内容的网站，对其登载、链接、传播的淫秽色情、恐怖血腥等内容进行清理检查，凡有违反相关规定的内容应立即予以删除；
妓女日记
作者：爱你不久 | 写作状态：已完成 | 总点击：3,363,146 | 推荐人数：3,806 | 更新于：2005-09-04 10:14
内容简介
并不是每一个小姐都是见钱就会脱裤子的人。她们也是人，她们也有自尊。选择这个职业需要很大的勇气，另外说句笑话，也需要资本，像古代青楼女子。
而客人呢，有好点的，就只是让小姐陪着喝喝酒，跳跳舞，谈谈情；但也有不那么安分的，奇怪的是，这里面有很大部分平时都斯文得不得了。
这个世界太复杂了，存在即价值，但是不管你选择哪种存在状态，你都要为自己负责。
游客 一五一十 [ 2007-09-28 19:39 ] 删除
是不是惹了谁了,很快要禁书了
游客 游客 [ 2007-09-28 19:33 ] 删除
很真实！一不偷，二不抢！为了生活！
不是长久之计！
游客 7758521 [ 2007-09-28 17:30 ] 删除
游客 共和国和 [ 2007-09-28 17:29 ] 删除
游客 森火 [ 2007-09-28 01:20 ] 删除
吖吖个嘿！还蛮感人滴，丫头你不错，顶你！最让我感动的是你那份孝心，差点眼泪没流下来。再骂骂一下楼上老兄，咱中国人的信任都被你这号人搞坏了，顶你个肺！
游客 一五一十 [ 2007-09-28 19:39 ] 删除
是不是惹了谁了,很快要禁书了
游客 游客 [ 2007-09-28 19:33 ] 删除
很真实！一不偷，二不抢！为了生活！
不是长久之计！
游客 7758521 [ 2007-09-28 17:30 ] 删除
游客 共和国和 [ 2007-09-28 17:29 ] 删除
游客 森火 [ 2007-09-28 01:20 ] 删除
吖吖个嘿！还蛮感人滴，丫头你不错，顶你！最让我感动的是你那份孝心，差点眼泪没流下来。再骂骂一下楼上老兄，咱中国人的信任都被你这号人搞坏了，顶你个肺！
September 28th, 2007 at 8:29 pm
标题:11
五月三十一日 星期二 阴
早早来到公司，跟化妆师把这个月的化妆费结了。一百零五块，她说没零钱找，所以把五块的零头记到下个月帐上。（反正一句话，不送）
其实我也考虑过她收入还是不错，如果为了省点我们都自己化妆估计马上她就失业，但是有些钱是不能省的，首先你要考虑关系问题，还有一点，大家都喜欢攀比，举个例子，每天晚饭都是一起吃，AA出钱，你能带个饭盒之内的来吗？所以她生意兴隆。当然还有很多同事不会自己化妆（不是不会化，是越化越糟糕）。
谈到攀比就不得不说化妆品的问题了，以前大家都很少带彩粉眼影之内的东西来，但是经过化妆师近来的宣传（如一般的粉底会伤害皮肤，用她推荐的“玫琳凯”美白粉底乳，在美白的同时滋润肌肤，有多么多么好，例如再配合“四色幻彩眼影腮红”，化出来的效果会如何如何倾国倾城……）
好多同事纷纷掏腰包购买，不得不否认他们在攀比，而老八最不示弱，一口气买了“幻时六件套”，外加一些口红粉饼之类，硬是花了三千多。用后还跟我们大谈养肤之道，效果有多明显，恨不得让你摸摸她保养后的脸蛋。
经过她的活体宣传，化妆师的产品销售最近做的很不错，差不多每个人都买了她传销的产品，只有我没有掏腰包。一句话，舍不得，也觉得不值得，让她们笑笑也无所谓。而笑的最开心的应该就数化妆师了，每个月靠推销产品又可以赚不少。
越往后走天越热，客人会减少的很厉害，（冬天进来可以说是洗澡，天热了很多人为了脸面不好意思进来，再说大热天有多少人愿意运动呢？）所以趁天气还不是太热我要多赚钱，有点积蓄也好度过武汉漫长的夏天。
这几天客人明显多了起来，（看来春夏之交男人容易燥动），今天高峰时候还出现过客人和客人抢房间的闹剧。大家都忙个不停，大厅的电话报钟铃更是响个不断，也奇怪，如果那个电话铃在安静时候响会觉得刺耳。而喧闹时候的大厅听不到此起彼伏的铃声就会觉得欠缺什么（当然这种情况永远不会发生）。
不到半夜两点半，我就上了六个钟，几乎没有间断。
为了多赚单肯定得提高上钟率，不能总在休息室坐着。
今天我推荐了老八两次和我一起上钟。（我们都是互相推荐，也就是说两个女人同时和一个男人做，好象有些男人特别喜欢这种感觉，占有欲很强，似乎他是古代的皇帝，而这种做法美其名曰“双飞”）。
2005-09-06 15:27:32
—lujion【楼主】 | 回复
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[23楼]：
每次推荐只要成功了，我下钟后就不用再排队，可以第一个排着上钟，老八愿意我更愿意，因为我们在一起的时候有个人可以短暂休息，反正客人在换人的时候也得换安全套，只当他两个钟点了两个不同的人。（问题他只有一个钟的时间）
最高兴的肯定是公司了，在一个钟点内，一间房间赚到了两个钟点才能赚到的钱，提高了赚钱效率，象今天这种人多房少要打架的饱和情况下，最大限度的发挥每间房的利用率。当然真的房间使用到了百分之百，就会出现大厅客人人满为患排队等候了。难怪高峰时候和老八路过大厅看到有位外地客人和前台接待吵的很厉害，原因是他洗完澡后等待了太长的时间没有安排到房间，旁边有位武汉男人帮他争，估计是一起来的。这位客人很激动的用广东话骂，有句话很难听，同时我也听的很清楚，说干我们这行的是“流动公厕”。
（操，你急的时候也知道找厕所！为什么不到街上解决问题啊！）我心里骂着的时候回头看了老八一眼，当时她根本就好象没听见一样，表情是那么自然。后来到了休息室问她心里骂了那个家伙没有，她的回答让我更惊讶“习惯了，比这骂得还难听的都忍了，接着赚钱呗！”
两点半的时候刚回休息室坐下，林姐就通知我上钟，（刚给一个客人推荐了和老八一起做，推荐的时候故意告诉他这叫“双飞”，所以他就听我的安排了）。是一个客人要洗盐奶浴。
走进洗盐奶浴的房间，发现只有中间的那间房门关着。
敲了敲门，没声音回答。
接着敲，还是没人回答。
我推了一下，门没锁。
洗浴床上躺着一个很瘦弱的男人，脸通红，眼睛闭着，好象很难受的样子。显然喝多了。
“我是五十八号，很高兴为您服务”
他抽动了一下，还是没太大的反应。
“帮您把衣服脱掉行吗？”
话音刚落就看到他那双麻杆一样的手抬了起来。（看来还有知觉，我心里庆幸）
也没费多大劲就把他的衣服裤子都脱掉了，（因为他挺瘦的，腰围估计最多一尺九），最吃惊的是在他那还算是结实的左肩膀上，有一朵玫瑰的纹身，一朵黑玫瑰，带着图腾般的刺妖艳地绽放，底下还纹着几个英文字母。
（让我吃惊的不是纹身，而是图案。男人纹身我见多了，胸前后背纹龙，虎，仙鹤图案的最多，在肩膀上纹玫瑰的男人到是第一个见，而且这朵玫瑰还纹得挺好看）。
2005-09-06 15:27:32
—lujion【楼主】 | 回复
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[24楼]：
后来呢？
2005-09-06 15:27:32
—yinhong【猫族】 | 回复
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[25楼]：
“先生，我可以为你开始洗盐浴了吗？”
他的头动了一下，我感觉是还行，于是拧开花洒替他调水温。
我故意把水温度调得有些高，当水淋到他身体的时候，突然他好象受到惊吓一样，拼命喊冷。
没办法，总不能只开热水把他煮了吧！我替他打开浴霸的开关。象哄孩子一样告诉他不再冷了。
他倒是没有喊冷了，一通洗下来，我已经被烤的大汗淋漓了。
替他穿好衣服，几乎是架着把他送到房间。
把他扶到床上的那一刻，我差不多筋疲力尽，不管他多瘦，整个人都承在我身上都够份量了，还加上他的腿都不知道迈，差不多是在地上拖，（反正进来后就没看到他脚上的拖鞋）。更不谈他身上熏人的酒气。
安顿好他，我走出房间，在走道上找回了那双拖鞋。
回到房间，他嘴里不停说着什么，我赶忙凑上去问：
“先生需要什么服务吗？”
“水，我要喝很多很多水”听他的声音感觉渴的很厉害。
小跑着我到走廊的饮水机打了四杯热水。
回到房间，他还躺在那里。
我半扶着，他坐了起来，我把水杯端着喂他喝。他饮得很急，差不多一口一杯。不一会工夫，床边只剩下了四个空杯。
“我要吐了”（好家伙）
一下他趴在床边。把脑袋垂了下来，差不多接触到地板。
“你千万挺一下”闪电的速度我提着塑料垃圾桶递到他嘴边（要是吐在房间公司又要罗嗦了），值得高兴的是他挺住了。
还好桶里面套了个新的垃圾袋，谢天谢地。
对着垃圾桶，他开始狂吐不止，我都看的有点恶心了，加上空气中弥漫着很浓的酒精味，我也想吐了。
强忍着我坐在旁边帮他拍着后背，好让他吐的干净些，对喝多的人来说，这样也应该舒服点。
他吐了好长时间，刚开始是连续的，到后面却是断断续续，好象每次吐出都要酝酿，伴随着咳嗽声。拍他后背的时候我发现桶里吐的差不多全是水，没有脏兮兮的混合物。
“干吗这样个喝法呢？当时你吃点菜也会强些撒！”
显然他清醒多了，竟然回答我：
“那里没有菜，只有酒”
“哪里只有酒啊？你不知道少喝点？”
“回归二，我一个人喝了一瓶芝华士”（挺能喝而且挺能吐的）
他指的位置是武汉江滩的一间酒吧，很多“嗨”的人喜欢去。
“其实上还是有点西瓜，鸭颈之类的，我都冒吃，就记得喝酒了”
看来他清醒很多了。
“少喝点，多伤身体啊！”（七不害人八不害人酒害人，这回我也是受害者，所以我说的很真心）
“不要说了”他打断了我，抱着垃圾桶接着酝酿，再出来的，我估计都是胆汁了。
许久，他象是清空了，看这情况我把他扶着躺下，赶忙跑到走廊又打了一杯水。回到他身边，递给他让漱漱口。
好象舒服了很多，他躺着没发出声音。
刚起身准备收拾垃圾，他又趴在床边，抱着垃圾桶，那感觉好象今生今世不会分离。
“你不能拿走，我还需要！”（第一回有人跟我争垃圾桶）
“那你等一会，我换个袋子啊！坚持一下”半跑着我丢掉袋子。
他真的克制力强，换好袋子的一刹那，又开始……
直到催钟的电话响起，他还不能站起来。（但是情况已经好多了，起码不会抱着桶死不放了）
我让他休息会，到了大厅领了单，回房间一看，他还躺着。
“先生您的单”虽然什么都没做，但单上的数字一个也不少。我有点担心他会不认单。
“您看看，一共是……”话还没完，他就示意我不要念了。
“你跟上面说，我等会来买单”。（到是个爽快人）
我陪在他身边，该死的电话催命样响。（突然又觉得它好刺耳了）
“你怎么半天不来结帐啊？”电话中前台接待等得有点不耐烦了。
“客人喝多了，起不了身，你来抬？”我也有点恼火。愤怒的挂掉电话。
“你扶我一下，我能走，不会为难你！”他还是挺理解我的难处。
“不要紧，你休息，他们不会催了”（说当然是这样说，前面的不急才怪）
“不了”勉强他站了起来，知道他不能走，我搀扶着他到了大厅。
买单的时候，他愤愤的骂了几句，收钱的那个接待一直不敢做声。
知道他不能走，于是我把他搀到休息区，那里休息的男人们都用异样的眼光看着我。（世界上睡满男人的地方是不能出现女人，起码当时我有步入狼群的感觉）
当他身体接触到休息沙发的时候，我听到三个字：“谢谢你”。
很长时间没听到这三个字了，是从心里发出的，而不是调侃我的那种。愣了一下。
回到休息室，林姐马上出现在我面前。
“跟你说过多少次公司规定不让你们进入休息厅的，你不知道条例？”她的性格是这样的。习惯了。
“对不起，我知道了，客人喝的有点多，下次不会了”认错其实我也不服，怕只怕开单，所以承认的特快。
“下次注意啊！”还是林姐好，手下留情。
人在屋檐下，不得不低头，所以我低头的速度随着年龄增长越来越快。
洗去一身的酒味，回到休息室，迅速掏出我的小本，熟练的记录下“五月三十一日，全套七次，盐浴+30”
六月一日(儿童节) 星期三 晴
今天，一个阳光灿烂的日子。
刚起床就收到朋友的短信：“天使说只要站在用心画的九十九朵郁金香中许愿，上帝就会听到。我把花画满整个房间，上帝对我说年轻人许愿吧！我说我要现在看短信的那个小孩儿童节快乐^_^。”
不是收到她的留言，几乎忘了今天还是个节日。起来时候最真的感觉：“一切跟我无关”。
拿起手机我回复这位挚友“帮我问问天使，天堂里面会有眼泪吗？”得到的回答“当然拉，可能不叫眼泪”，也许我们都太成熟，而有时候却又象个孩子。
午后一点的阳光总让人觉得浑身无力。这些时已经不再习惯睡眠很长时间，四五个小时就会起床，哪怕我已经很累。起码不算失眠，因为回家一躺到床上我就会进入梦乡，但每次梦醒的时候太快，就再也无法入睡。如果有天做了个甜蜜的梦，我情愿幸福的不再醒来。
习惯性走进厨房，打开冰箱，低头看看，关上冰箱。（明知里面一无所有，因为那只是一种习惯）。算了，还是现实点——方便面。烧上一小锅水（从来不喜欢用开水泡出的面，太柔软，象腐烂的棉絮），放上作料等水沸腾，等待的时候盯着平静水面我开始发傻：“曾经听过有个实验，把青蛙突然丢进滚水中，它会跳出滚水，但一开始把那只跳出过滚水的青蛙放进冷水中，慢慢的加热，它会很自然的游，直到最后自然的死去。我是不是那只游泳的青蛙？”
往碗里盛面时，手被溅起的开水烫起一个不小的泡，（但已经不知道疼了，可能也有睡眠太少的关系），突然我明白了，自己是那只游泳的青蛙，绝对不会因为烫过，就不再煮面而饿坏自己。
2005-09-06 15:27:32
—lujion【楼主】 | 回复
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[29楼]：
还没有吃完，手机收到朋友的短消息“离开忧郁的习惯，到外面走走吧！”
这个礼拜都是晚班，还有好长的时间要打发，决定出去走走，并没有目的。
路过轻轨车站的时候，看到头上呼啸而过的火车，才发觉自己从来还没坐过。（今天乘一趟城市列车，当给自己一个惊喜，体会一次过节的感觉吧！）
顺着盲道，迈过一级级台阶，（我喜欢走盲道，脚下有比眼睛看到的那更真实感觉，特别是每一个路口交汇处的盲道，会有很大面积凸起，踩上去脚底会有丝丝的隐痛，提示下一个转折），我登上站台，刚好碰到一列进站的火车。
随着熙熙攘攘的人流，踏进陌生的车厢，找了个靠近窗户的位置坐下，我开始欣赏窗外的风景。窗外，熟悉的楼房和街道象幻灯片一闪而过，而对我来说它们又是那样陌生。
车到站了，一位母亲带着孩子站到我身旁，小丫头很可爱，大概有六七岁，用红苹果形容她的脸蛋真的不过份，眼睛好奇地盯着车门，观察着随蜂鸣声关闭的门。她穿着节日的花裙子，手里还拿着一个很大的波板糖。
我环顾一下四周，车厢的板凳差不多坐满了，大多数都是父母带着孩子。可能今天很多孩子的心愿和我一样，就是坐一趟轻轨火车吧！
“小妹妹，到姐姐这里来坐吧！”我准备起身。
“你坐你坐，别起来，怡怡挨着这位漂亮姐姐坐好不好？”孩子的母亲很客气，不好意思让我起来。
“好啊！谢谢大姐姐”小丫头很有礼貌。
她偎依在我身旁，很恬静的看着我。
“小妹妹，你叫什么名字啊？”
她没有回答，抬头看着母亲，眼光中充满无助。
“告诉姐姐你的名字啊！”母亲看着自己女儿带着默许但又十分温暖的说。
“我叫张馨怡，是温馨的馨”
“那你告诉姐姐怡怡几岁拉？”
“我六岁半”小丫头的声音很甜，传到我耳朵里是天籁般的声音。很纯真。
“怡怡长大想做什么啊？”
小家伙想了想，冲着我很淘气的抿嘴一笑：
“我不告诉你！”在她心里，似乎藏着很大的梦想。
“那姐姐你是做什么的拉？”突然她问了我一个难度很大的问题。
2005-09-06 15:27:32
—lujion【楼主】 | 回复
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[30楼]：
（平时回答客人的问题我能面不改色，现骗如流，但是今天突然感觉我的脸有点发烧。回答是学生吧？我这个年纪现在这个时间跑出来坐轻轨的百分之百是逃课坏学生）
“姐姐啊–是卖东西的”（模糊的回答一般很容易混过去）
“姐姐是商场的的售货员啊！”小丫头理会的比我透彻。
“对了，怡怡真聪明！”（给个台阶让自己下）
“那姐姐是卖什么东西的啊？”
（这一刻我差点晕掉，快想想平时，编熟悉的吧！平时买的最多就是安全套，再就是消毒湿纸巾）
“姐姐是在超市销售生活用品的。”（好模糊的回答，肯定她会提问的，为了拖延一下，连“销售”这个比较专业的词我都用上了）
“比如说怡怡平时用的洗手液，消毒纸巾啊！“施乐氏”这个牌子怡怡见过吗？”（这个牌子我用的最多了，因为广告上说能杀很多细菌，而且十五片的那种比较实惠）
“和妈妈在超市见过，姐姐是卖这的啊！”（谢天谢地，总算过去了）
“怡怡的波板糖好漂亮哦！”我岔开话题（真的不想被一个只有六岁半的孩子拆穿谎言）
“姐姐小时候有我这样的糖糖吗？”边问她边转动着手中的糖，带着几分炫耀神情。
“没有啊，姐姐小时候只有棒棒糖卖”（那时候能吃上一角钱一个的棒糖对我们家三个孩子来说是件很珍贵的事情了）
看着她手中转动的波板糖，我真的很羡慕……
“今天儿童节，妈妈要带我到中山公园玩，还要坐旋转木马，漂亮姐姐再见”伴随着广播的报站声，她依依不舍的离开了我。
我漫无目地的坐在车内，回想着刚才欺骗小丫头的话，还有她手中转动的波板糖，任凭火车从起点驶向终点……
晚上下班回家，我累得倒在床上，朦胧中，不知道算不算是梦，在老屋后那开满野菊花的山坡上，满天飞舞的花瓣雨中，三个小丫头，嘴里吮着棒糖，不停的跑着笑着，疯闹着……
2005-09-06 15:27:32
—lujion【楼主】 | 回复
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[31楼]：
continue
2005-09-06 15:27:32
—ybpp | 回复
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[32楼]：
怎么没有了，快贴呀
2005-09-06 15:27:32
—梦天使之翼 | 回复
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[33楼]：
六月二日 星期四 晴
这几天情绪很低落，身边发生太多事情让我一下难已平静。
昨天下班到今天早上一直没睡觉，等待着太阳的升起，总幻想着让阳光赶走心中的阴霾。
阳光照进窗户的那一刻，我的心好象平静了很多，夜的黑，已经有些让我颤抖。此刻的阳光象扶助我心灵的双手，那么温暖和无私。
赶上早晨的公交车，很久没有乘公共汽车了，原来它也变得那样舒适，空调的风很凉爽，加上宽厚的座椅，舒适的让我想睡觉。很多人躲避太阳的直射，拉上窗帘，而我，却打开窗帘，沐浴着早晨阳光。（有些浪漫，但这样我会不容易睡着）
车到了汉阳钟家村，步行不久就看到了归元寺那古老的身影。心中一直抹不去的低落感此刻突然消失无踪。
进入院中，我忘掉了很多，只有见到虔诚的人。
跪在佛面前，闭上眼睛我什么都没思考，只是双手合十默默空空。当磕完三次头后，睁开双眼的一刹那，突然跳进眼帘的是佛像上那块横扁书着的四个金光大字“回头是岸”。
路过藏经阁，看到门口漆柱上的两行大字，“见了便做做了便放下了了有何不了，慧生于觉觉生于自在生生还是无生”，我很喜欢，读了半天也没懂，但似乎又有点明白。索性把句子用手机记下。
今天来归元寺最大的目的就是到观音像前跪下，愿她能接受我虔诚的祈求。
后院广场上，太阳把脚下的地砖晒得发烫。
远远就看见巨大的双面观音铜像，是那么安详和宁静。
走到观音面前，跪在石头拜台上，想起这几天发生的事情，几乎让我不能控制自己的泪水，只想完成这次来的心愿，默默祈祷。跪在佛面前，知道佛能够宽容象我这样的凡人，哪怕我错了很多，她都不会拒绝。
闭上眼睛的时候，我没有丝毫为自己祈祷，（为自己太过自私，也没资格），思绪中全是重复着这样的想法“愿佛保佑我所有的朋友和家人平安健康……”
走出庙外，太阳依然那灿烂，心灵的痛经过短暂的洗涤好象轻了许多，是啊！生活总是有痛的，但痛只是记忆，依然每天要面对的还是生活。
拿起手机给好友发去我的祝福“我在菩萨面前许了愿，母亲的病会好的，而你和我都要坚强……”
2005-09-06 15:27:32
—lujion【楼主】 | 回复
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[34楼]：
记号
2005-09-06 15:27:32
—axuu【IT】 | 回复
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[35楼]：
mark
2005-09-06 15:27:32
—queenasweety | 回复
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[36楼]：
六月五日 星期天 晴转雨
武汉气温这几天高得有些离谱，我走在上班的路上，还没到公司，汗水已经把衣服舔得很透彻，紧紧贴着身体，不舒服。抬头看见那个太阳还死赖在天上不走，而模糊的月亮早就悄悄守侯在它身旁等着轮班。
到公司收到好消息——明天发工资。
化完妆，我坐在椅子上发着小呆。舒适享受着空调的冷气。
老八和三号都没来，中班的同事开始陆陆续续收拾衣服了，准备着下班。边打点边谈论着今天碰到怎样的事情。
“你们不知道今天我和四十六号碰到的事情有多笑人”二十六号笑着对房间里面所有的人说。（她总是这样，笑话没讲就自己先笑）
“是么事情撒？”门口传来三号的声音。转眼一看，她慢悠悠的晃了进门，手上还提着个大袋子。每谈到这种张家长李家短的时候，她总能赶上话题。
边问着三号边往衣柜走，经过我旁边时候还逗似的揪了一下我耳朵。
“快说啊！”旁边几个同事因为三号进门打断了故事而有些着急。
“也是的，你快说撒！”三号还接了一句，不是她接嘴人家都讲完了，反而她还没事似的。
二十六号开始滔滔不绝：“今天下午来了个客人点了我，聊了一会他就说最喜欢四川妹子，再一聊，是两个朋友请他，我一听就劝他做双飞，他蛮快答应了，我就和四十六号一起做了”（她们两个都是四川过来的，老乡）
“锤子，我听说是他的客户，有事求他帮忙，那两个一起来的也在隔壁两个房间耍了的！”四十六了解的更深入些。
“我在总台递单的时候，他还没出房间，那两个人要总台算帐。算完了和总台争了起来”
讲着她准备卖个关子，但看到大家都疑惑的望着她，二十六号不敢拖延。
“那两个男人声音不大，只是问总台三个人为啥子收了四个人的钱”“总台的小姐又不会说话，只是说要他们问一起来的朋友”“过了半天他出来了，看到朋友围着就过去问，一谈到多收一个人钱的时候，他还有点吞吞吐吐。结果搞了一句‘两个都是我的单’。笑死人了”她一个人讲，可是没有人笑。
“最好笑的是那两个马上改口了，买单时不停说值得，还称赞‘拐子，身体就是好’，看到那两个拍马屁的样子，我真恨不得上去憋机憋机两耳司”
大家都笑了，还有笑出眼泪的，不是她的笑话，而是她的“憋机憋机两耳司”（四川话给两耳光，特形象，感觉带着声音，加上她的动作，更让人捧腹）”
上班以后，林姐通知我下周继续上晚班，因为有一个同事走了。人不够。（对我来说算是坏消息了）
走人的事情大家见多了，有的还没来做到一天就走了，只要不是关系很好，很熟，走了一般都不会相互留电话。还有一点，很熟的姐妹也不见得相互清楚对方具体的住址。不会有人主动问，都只知道大概位置。当然也有例外，象我和静。
2005-09-06 15:27:32
—lujion【楼主】 | 回复
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[37楼]：
礼拜天，是很无聊，平淡熬着，还没到四点，林姐跑来通知大家外面下雨了，可以提前下班，（这种情况从我到这个公司以来很少）。
大家商量着如何回家，因为雨来得太突然了，没有一个人准备了伞。
老八打电话给她的司机，要他提前来接，（很多住址较远的同事都有专门接送的出租车）。
“走拉，我带你一程”她对三号说。
“今天有顺风车坐了，五十八，一起走？”三号问我
“算了，又不顺路，再说我家近，没事的”我回绝了她们。
反正下雨了，想想时间还早，又洗了个澡。磨蹭完之后，我走出公司。
雨下的有些大，小跑着到了门大门口。就那么短短一段路，头发和衣服都被淋湿。
有些无助的站在大门口门卫室旁，孤望着寂静的马路，夜很黑，只有单调的雨声，伴随着头上霓虹灯的闪烁。
一阵夜风袭来，身体禁不住打了个寒战，好冷，很渴望有台出租车经过，载我回家。（平时公司门口都有出租车守侯，今天都不见了，见鬼）
我不停的左右张望，希望看到哪怕只是一丝灯光。
马路对面有个模糊的人影突然向我这边走来。出于本能，我盯着他的一举一动。
“才下班啊”距离还有些远，他对我开始打招呼。
疑惑的我看着走来的人，没太看清楚脸，感觉陌生。
他走到我我面前，冲我微笑打招呼“才下班？没带伞啊？”
看着面前的男人，我脑海还在思索，有些印象，又有些朦胧，木纳的看着他。
“谢谢你那天照顾我，真的醉的太厉害，我没有把你衣服弄脏吧？”他有些不好意思但又十分感激的说，听的出语气中带着歉意。
想起来了，那天的那朵黑玫瑰，不是那朵玫瑰，我得稍微搜索更长时间，喝醉了来的人实在太多了。
“没有啊！还好拉！”我也不知道该说什么，只想说的自然点。
“你没有带伞，这么大的雨，又没车，准备淋回去？”黑玫瑰说（不知道他的名字，当然他更不知道我名字）
我看了看他，身上的灰衬衣贴着身体几乎变成紧身衣。而双手是空空的。
“你也没带伞啊！”
“哦，是的，雨下起来很突然，所以没带”
“这么晚来你不会又喝酒了吧？”我半开玩笑着试探他。
“没有没有，我是专程来谢谢你的”
如果有男人跟我说这句话，我会警觉，但看到他那落汤鸡的样子，又多了几分信任。
“谢我干什么？”
“谢谢你那晚照顾我，端茶倒水，我记得当时路都走不直，还是你扶我，觉得差你太多，所以跑来说声谢谢”他有些不好意思的说。
我看了看四周，正是公司大门口，保安室的保安正好奇盯着看我们，感觉他碰到现场直播。也怪，这么冷清的夜，看两个被淋湿的活人讲话也可以打发无聊的时间。
“我要回家了，看来等不到车了”跟他说明我不愿意站在公司门口。
“哦，这么晚了，我送送你吧，现在也不是很安全”他挺能理会的，但是要送我？
矛盾，感觉他站在我的旁边都有点不太安全，又不是很熟。转念一想，也不会，起码我是照顾过他，哪怕是收了钱的。
这样，在回家的路上，两个人淋着雨走着。（换成我一人，我会小跑跑，算了，总是湿了的，无所谓）
（估计他会说吃宵夜这种话的，只要他说，我就会拼命找理由拒绝。男人想单独约我多半都是这句）我盘算着。
“我经常一个人淋雨，从来不带伞，你知道为什么吗？”他好象跟我很熟，讲的话也在我意料之外。
“你不会故意今天也不带伞吧？”虽然是半开玩笑，但我说出来后又有些后悔了。
“不是不是，真没想到会突然下雨”
“有什么好谢的，你喝多的时候又不闹事，还好啊！我做的只是份内的事”我岔开话题。
“但我还是要谢谢你”（一句话说了几遍，可能这句最能表达他的心意吧！）
“你怎么知道我这个时间下班啊？”我疑惑的问
“呵呵，那天我喝多了，在大厅休息，早上六点服务员叫我起来，说下班了，我就知道你可能六点下班。”
“那你今天怎么这早就来了啊？”（平时很晚下班，今天是特殊，他也能碰上？再说男人一般等人都会提前十分钟不得了）。
“我想早点来，怕碰不上你，其实我很习惯等人几个小时”（今天碰到怪人了）
“那如果我今天休息你不就白等了？”我开始逗他，因为他说的话有些怪。
“不会啊！在你之前有很多女孩从大门口走出，我想等下去，到了六点还碰不到，第二天再来。”他肯定的说。（但我有些不相信，完全没这种必要）。
“对了，我刚才说到不喜欢带伞，你把我打断了”他突然提起。
“为什么啊？真的还不知道”。（肯定是偷懒之类理由的话）
“我不喜欢伞，因为‘伞’和‘散’同音。”他回答出让人更加不懂的理由……
雨一直下着，眼看快到了，“我马上到家了，就别送了，就这里吧！看你透湿，早点回去”我很提示性的说。
“哦，那我就不送了，你回家赶快把衣服换了，免得感冒。”他成熟又带有关心的说。
“知道了，谢谢你啊”这是真心的回答。
“你叫什么名字啊？”可能雨淋的人都变自然了，自然到没有问我名字。
“叫我晶吧！”
“哦，晶，我走了，再见啊！”他匆匆消失在夜色中，走时挥手也没有回头，（怪怪的道别方式）但很随性。
上楼的时候，突然想起我忘了问怪人名字，倒不是很想知道，只是感觉这样会让他觉得太不礼貌，仔细想想怪人也不会很在乎吧？反正他够怪了。
淋了雨的夜，我睡得很香。
2005-09-06 15:27:32
—lujion【楼主】 | 回复
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[38楼]：
六月六日 星期一 雨
外面的雨一直下着，凉爽的感觉让人脱去很多疲惫。
迈着轻快的步子，我走上楼梯。
到公司的第一件事情就是去财务室，领上个月工资。（结果和我预算差不多）
路过大厅，发现几乎所有人都用奇怪的眼神看着我，连平时很少有接触的那个冷冰冰大厅接待都用一种异样眼光注视着我走路，和她眼神接触的一刹，她先低下头，写着写着，装做没有看我。
（今天这是怎么拉？不会我脸上有什么脏东西吧？）有些逃避的感觉，低着头悄然无声的溜进休息室。
一进休息室，就跑到化妆台镜子前，对着自己的脸仔细看了又看，没什么特别啊，离远一点，前后衣服都看了，也没什么问题，奇怪！
纳闷着换完工作服，再把装有工资的信封用换下的衣服包裹好，我锁上柜门，边关门边想：“三号来了一定问问她发生过什么事情”。
没一会，三号和几个上中班的同事说笑着进了门（今天我想没有哪个会迟到），刚看到我，就扯开嗓门嚷起来：“五十八，什么时候带到我们看一下撒，看不出来你这只闷鸡蛮会啄白米来！”
我更加纳闷了：“怎么得罪你了啊！说得这么难听！”
“有男朋友了都不通知我们一声，怕跟你抢跑了？带过来跟你参考一下，我的眼光可是很准的啊！”（她的话让我更加迷惑，哪来男朋友啊？）
“没有啊！谈了怕不请你们吃饭？”我很肯定的回答。
“你还鸭子死了嘴巴硬，人家花都送到前台放着，我们公司跟自己起名叫晶晶的，难道是我啊？那我就去把花拿了啊！只要你不跟我争！”
“前台放着有人送我的花？”我有点明白了，问了三号一句。
“快去拿过来撒，又不是么丑事！”
“哦”答应了一句我猜疑着走向前台。
还是那个冷冰冰在接待，我注意到墙边那个矮矮的文件柜上放着一束百合花，包装很是精美。
“请问是不是有花送给晶晶啊？”客气的问着。
“哦，是的，你是晶晶？”冷冰冰回答。
“自己起着好玩的名字，有些同事这样叫。”我解释到。
“这是你的花，花店送花人走了，没有要求签收”她递给我花，还是那样冷冰冰。
拿到手的时候，我几乎不太相信自己的眼睛，说真的，不是我没收到过鲜花，而是没有在这种场合收过。这是一束用紫色布纹纸包裹着的白合花，应该说不是一束，而是一捧，像婴儿的襁褓包装着，有些盛开着，有些含苞待放，散发着悠悠清香。有一张很小的卡片，天蓝天蓝的颜色，乖巧的躺在花束中。强忍着好奇，我捧着花回到休息室。
坐在椅子上，我平衡了一下激动的心情，打开卡片，是一行不很工整的小字“晶，谢谢你对我的照顾，陪我淋了一场舒心的雨，愿你开心每一天。君”不知道怎么搞的，当时我很想哭，但忍住了泪水。
三号她们都围着看花，不停而有些羡慕的夸送花人懂得浪漫。我浑然不知。把花搁在化妆台上，偷偷跑向卫生间，把门反锁躲在里面，这时眼眶再也挡不住泪水的泛滥，顺着脸颊不住下落……仅仅是因为收到一束白合花。
回到休息室，我把妆补了，三号看出我哭过，没有再拿我开玩笑，用很安慰的话告诉我：“真的这花蛮香”。
早上下班回到家里，我找到一个很久没用的工艺花瓶，将它洗涤干净，加上清水，细心插上百合花，摆弄着它的位置。这些盛开的花朵，是那么努力的展示自己生命的灿烂，同一枝杆上害羞的花苞，同样期待着未来的美丽……
躺在床上，听着窗外渐渐稀疏的雨声，感觉着漂来阵阵清香，我开始陶醉，开始昏昏欲睡，朦胧中耳边仿佛听到喜欢的那首老歌
“难道你不曾回头想想
昨日的誓言
就算你留恋开放在水中
娇艳的水仙
别忘了寂寞的山谷的角落里
野百合也有春天……”
过去 去过作者：爱你不久 | 总点击：3,367,083 | 出自：- | 授权级别：C级授权 | 责编：daniel本文由 AD2K.COM 网文报社提供 转载敬请保留相关信息
日记不再继续，已经完结。等自己感受到爱情快乐时，再去写完那几篇。毕竟是开心过。唯生活必须继续，有朋友说可以发展“写手，作家”，但我清楚自己，太平凡,能做的，只是记录。
不是幻想狂，也写不出没做过的事和没有经历过的感情。没必要表示日记真实性，每个读过的朋友会用心感受，用思维去判断。
今天看到网络上深圳两位女孩的痛苦经历，如果不是新闻标题，很多人可能又认为是一篇血腥变态的小说。
其实生活比小说有时候更加残酷，生活中小说中，同样都被称做“鸡”，其实，即使她们错得再多，一样是有血有肉有精神的——人。她们不需要同情和怜悯，也许，得到更多的是嘲笑和唾骂。但她们依然顽强的活着。同样有着人的尊严和思想。
网络上，不追求任何东西，平等的和很多朋友在一起，就会感到快乐，但也绝对划分生活和网络。能放开了说些实话的地方，简单思想里应该是网络。
很多朋友问为什么起“爱你不久”这个ID？其实只是想写的时候，登陆注册时，准备用“爱你不久只一生”，但天涯注册格子中不让写这么多文字，随便丢弃了后面的三个字，我就成“爱你不久”了。
不久以后，日新月异追求新鲜的网络会淹没这篇日记，但我很开心，曾经笑着哭着写过，也有了这么多朋友。得到得到的，失去失去的。
“我的路不在小朋友走的小小的路上，我的路不在汽车跑的宽宽的路上。上山时我喜欢走我的路，下山时我和小鸟一起唱歌。要是你们也肯在我的路上走走，你们会听见我和小鸟在唱歌。听着歌声向前走，路就是再长，也不会觉得累。我喜欢走我的路。” ——佘艳亲笔文章《我的路》
我从不看书，包括小说，因为很多作家写手的强词我看不懂，太高深，会感到很累，但看到这位因为白血病离开世界的小女孩留下一段文字，我哭了，因为真实，生活真实让她简单的文字充满生命。她很乖，来过这世界，留下她能留下的东西。
写不出非真实的东西，注定我是个平凡的人，但每个平凡人，都有感动世界的一幕。
夜深，听到喜欢的歌曲，看到大家真诚话语，有一种莫名感动，但不知如何言表，只懂得，有朋友，是幸福。
简单思想里，什么都不为，才最真实，因为哭和笑，悲伤和开心，用文字记录。平静的摸摸胸膛，会被自己震撼，因为里面有那颗跳动的心。
没什么可给你，只有这阙歌，声音比任何东西来得更直接，希望你能喜欢。
我会好好生活下去，坚强走在路上，有过自己经历，再写出真实生活。哪怕那天只有你一人看，我也会很开心。
斑斓因为色彩，色彩来自感觉，感觉反映真实。
September 28th, 2007 at 9:03 pm
标题:对爱你不久的<小姐日记>的感想
对爱你不久的<小姐日记>的感想
2006-10-29 16:23:23
大中小
爱你不久应该不是小姐。
她写得小说显示了很深的写作水平。
小说的主题是，小姐也是有血有肉有感情的人，不应该作为社会最低层而被人忽视，被人当作没有思想没有感觉的躯壳。
其中描写了很多作为小姐为客人性服务的场面，而同时也写了很多小姐的同事之间互相关心互相帮助的温馨场面。主角与静的友谊，新疆的小姐叙述新疆人之间的团结，听到同事结婚的兴奋与祝愿，等等等等。还有主角对父母的百般孝顺，更让人对这位小姐的品性赞赏有加。想想我们身边的多少人，有这高尚的工作和很高的收入，然而还对父母十分的不敬？这一切都与主角做为一名被社会所不齿的小姐，被社会认为是堕落肮脏的现实，形成了强烈的，让人震撼的对比。震撼之后，会让人感觉到，这位小姐本质十分的善良，对待感情十分认真而且纯洁，对父母非常孝顺，甚至，有着现代女性都少有的单纯和可爱。
其中主角与君的感情，有着太多的纯洁，连现在很多普通人的感情都无法比拟。而她对父母的孝顺也是很多普通人都无法企及的。这样好的品质和性格，集中在了一位小姐身上，是一种极大的反差。我想，读者之所以喜欢这个小说，喜欢里面的主角，就是因为这些吧。
而主角还有一种重要的性格，就是温顺（当然是经历了很多之后被磨练的），有些任劳任怨甚至是逆来顺受。从每次主角“服务完毕后在本子里熟练地记下xx一次，xxx全套”可以看出。给客人服务，出卖身体，是对女性最大的侮辱，而主角每次都习惯地，熟练地记录下来，只为怕总台落单，而不是写下咒骂和反抗，这个细节不能不让人心痛。这也体现了主角的温顺甚至是被麻木了心态。
此外，主角的名字皓也是有含义的。皓是白的意思，常说皓白，就是非常的白。颜料中的皓色，就是纯白色。皓这个字在名字中出现是很少的（大多数是同音字“浩”），而爱你不久把主角名字起为皓，就是暗喻了主角心灵和性格的纯净与纯洁。这也是与主角小姐的身份有着强烈对比的。
那么，主角单单只是一名有着高尚品格的“另类”的小姐吗？小说深度只到这个层次吗？显然不是！
主角的美好品质（甚至可以说是东方传统女性特有的品格：善良，单纯，温顺），和她作为小姐在床上被很多男人任意摆布而顺服地承受，没有太多的抱怨反抗的情节，给我们以极深的震撼。而震撼之后我们不禁要思考，为什么她这么好的女孩，这么善良的女孩，没能象大多数20多岁女孩一样，有温暖的家，体贴的父母，接受大学的高等教育呢？
如果说的大一点，那就是对黑暗社会现实的批判，对这个不公平世界的愤怒。
皓这样好的女孩沦为小姐，是谁造成的？是自己吗？是她自己为了金钱利益，不惜出卖一切吗？显然不是。同事买几千元的marykay护肤品她并不买。她的家里很简单，而电脑的质量也不是很好的（坏了几次）。她不是那种极端物质的女孩。那么到底是什么使她走上了这条路？文中没有说，但我们可以猜得出来。什么原因也不外乎是社会原因。现在的社会收入分化，极端不均，各种黑暗到处存在。只能是社会的原因，虽然她没有具体说出来。因为如果在70年代那种纯净的社会下，不可能有这样善良纯洁的人去被迫做小姐。
虽然爱你不久在小说没有一句直接对这个主题进行表述，而是好象以一种很随意很生活的语言娓娓道来。但我们从种种强烈的对比和情节的安排上，可以看到作者心里巨大的悲哀和强大的愤怒。这么好的女孩，被社会折磨的连卖身都默默的习惯的接受。对父母那么孝顺，对朋友那么关心，对感情那么纯洁，现实中都很少能找到的好女孩却要每天在床上被很多男人玩弄。这样大的反差，这样的不合理不协调，怎么能让人不从内心感觉到愤怒？怎么能让人不从内心感觉悲怜与惋惜？皓越可爱，品质越高尚，让读者越感觉到不可遏止的愤怒，仿佛要把这个社会的黑暗彻底打碎，把皓救出水深火热。作者没有说出来，留给读者去感受。但作者的内心我相信也是极度的悲哀，极度的愤怒的。
这样一部语言平实，情节生活的小说，却包含了这么多暗喻，这么深的想法，这么大的主题背景，实在不是一般意义上的小说，也实在不是一般写手所能写得出来的。
如果按文学史教科书上的术语，这就是一部深刻揭露和批判现实的现实主义巨著。我说的并不夸大。
当然，这个小说里的巧妙的之处还有很多，我会以后再仔细地整理一下写出来。
毫无疑问，这个小说看似简单，实则极其深刻，带着作者浓重的感情，是一部不可多得的优秀作品。
能写出这样的小说，我认为决不是一个真正的小姐所能为。
to 爱你不久：我对你驾御情节和语言的能力印象太深刻了，你的水平真的很高！写作的风格和沈从文很有点象！不知你对我对你的作品的理解是否认同？能否来我的blog留言？
September 28th, 2007 at 9:11 pm
标题:对<小姐日记>的细节的看法
<小姐日记>的细节的看法 编辑 2006-10-29 16:31:22
除了前面说到的，《小姐日记》的主题思想之外，这部小说还有很多细节的地方值得我们去理解和品读。
小说的一大特色就是对比。对皓这名小姐的人性的描写，对她丰富的情感的刻画，把她塑造成为一个有血有肉真真切切的普通女孩子。而这样一个可爱的，感性的女孩子却从事着妓女的工作，被各种各样的男人玩弄。强烈的对比，留给了我们深刻的印象。而小说中很多细节，可以说是对这种对比的完美诠释。
虽然皓在一个普通人眼中可能是肮脏的，腐败的，正直的人避而远之的妓女，但在小说中她是一个有着一切普通女孩子所拥有的正常的，善良的，朴素的，纯洁的情感的人。
“低头一看，是两年前生日那天，当时已经分手三个多月的男朋友风送给我生日的礼物，一个木头相框。”
在很多人眼中妓女不配拥有感情。被那么男人玩弄哪里还有人愿意要呢？虽然事实可能如此，但在皓的心中和记忆里，也是曾经拥有过美丽的纯真的爱情的。她现在虽然被很多男人玩弄，但她的以前，却是和我们的女同事，女同学一样的，一个最最普通的女孩子。
“早先他说家里要盖房子，我就答应给钱，所以我要多攒点。”
这是皓在父母来看望时的心里独白。皓来做妓女，不是为了虚荣，不是为了买房子买车，而是为了给父亲盖新房子。家里面太穷了，父亲盖放要砍树，皓有三个姐妹，而亲妈已经过世，现在是后妈带着。当然这不会是直接原因，但这绝对是一个重要原因。一个殷实的家庭，即使是农民，他们的女儿也决不会去做妓女。在这里也能看出皓的孝顺。现在多少的女孩子花着父母吃着父母还不满足，败家的很。和皓相比，多么大的反差。
“端午节，收到很多祝福，君发来：“端午节快乐，愿你生活就象粽子一样有滋有味，财富象盐蛋一样富得冒油……”当然还有很多远方朋友们对我最真的祝福。很开心，因为这个端午并不象去年那样感觉得孤单。
中午到楼下买了两个盐蛋，一块四，一个自己吃，还有一个留着看。
看着桌上的盐蛋，就想起童年，每到端午节，母亲都会用钩针将五彩的线钩一个放盐蛋的网，放入一枚盐蛋，挂在我们胸前。这天和其他小朋友一起玩耍时，大家都比较谁的盐蛋更大，谁的网更漂亮。”
这是皓的端午节。有朋友的祝福，有传统节日的鸡蛋，还有对以往快乐童年的回忆。多么美好幸福的图景！咋看过去这分明是一个幸福的少女无忧无虑生活的描写。谁能想到这些却是属于一个小姐呢？皓身为小姐，却有着美好的回忆，有着过传统节日的情调，有着关心她的朋友发来的温馨短信。
“病了吗？哪里不舒服？”
“能陪我去看病吗？我很害怕！”说着，我快要哭了出来。
“到楼下老地方站着等我，马上来”
这是深夜里皓发烧后君赶来前的对白。谁说小姐很下贱，连朋友都没有？这样的关心，这样的真诚，恐怕你我身边的朋友也不一定能做到这个样子吧！
昨天已经跟林姐请假换了班，听到我将参加婚礼去做伴娘，林姐很高兴，还嘱咐要打扮漂亮点。
睁着眼睛躺在床上，想象着即将举行的那场婚礼。
当然我只能做配角，但能做这个配角，已经很兴奋。对着镜子试了又试，还是最喜欢那件天蓝色的无袖连衣裙，不知是否合适穿到婚礼这样隆重的场合，其实很想给君打个电话，问问他的看法。
这是皓去给人当伴娘前夜的情景。多么的期待，多么的向往，多么地认真的准备。几句朴实的语言，反映出了一个少女的爱情的渴望，对婚姻的向往。谁说小姐没有爱情没有梦想？展现在我们眼前的，不正是一个在青春期的少女对爱情的羞涩的期盼和甜蜜的幻想吗？多么鲜活的少女！
“静，你坐好点，把体温计夹好，量得才会准”，我说着，抓紧了静那只湿湿的小手掌，想起曾经与静合住那段时间，无聊时躺在床上，都拿出自己的手，高高举着，相互比较谁的秀气，谁的指甲更美丽。
“那时候身上都快没钱了，工作也没找到，你记得我们是怎样熬过来的吧？”
她竟然激动得讲起话来，虽然声音很微弱：“记得，这辈子都记得。”
“对啦，那时两个人把身上的钱凑到一起，买了二十块钱馒头，剩下的钱也就刚够买辣椒。”我边回忆边看着静。
小姐间的友谊也是多么的真诚！公同患难的好友，什么时候多不会忘记。难道只有水浒传里的绿林好汉才有这种义气吗？我们的皓和静也有。虽然她们在社会上是弱势，但她们之间的真诚友谊谁也抹杀不了。
这只是这个小说中的一部分细节的摘选。还有更多的值得参悟和品位的地方。
一个小说，一个网络上的小说，它的情节安排刻画能到这个程度，实在是难得。这不只在网络上，即使在现实中，也是一部难得作品。有眼光的人会读到它的精髓它的本质。
September 29th, 2007 at 5:44 am
标题:godmanbj兄，你在这个位置有篇转贴触发了GFW自动封锁，导致主坛从国外无法访问，只好删了。。。请谅解
September 29th, 2007 at 9:43 am
标题:我的错，sorry.
是那个《女支支日记》吧，那也有些怪啊
国内大概有几十万个页面都有，访问很顺利啊.
我怕不见，又放到我在sina的博客里保存了.
September 29th, 2007 at 10:04 am
标题:黄金均价明年或将站上800美元/盎司
黄金均价明年或将站上800美元/盎司
【2007.09.29 07:16】 来源：中国证券报 作者：何敏
当市场的基本面对金市构成利好形势证实了自己早期的乐观预期时，黄金分析大师马丁·莫伦贝尔德又预言2008年黄金均价将上涨到823美元/盎司。
他在丹佛黄金论坛上的发言中表示，2007年黄金均价将为683美元/盎司，而在2007年年底的时候会达到754美元/盎司。莫伦贝尔德通过计量经济学模型来预测金市走势。在过去的四年里，他的种种预言最后都得以证实。
在2006年的丹佛黄金论坛上，莫伦贝尔德预言2006年黄金均价将为605美元/盎司（2006年实际均价为604美元/盎司），2006年末金价将是646美元/盎司（2006年末实际金价为636美元/盎司），而2007年黄金均价将达到679美元/盎司。实际上，截至目前2007年黄金均价已为664美元/盎司。莫伦贝尔德指出如果金价一直保持在720美元高位上运行直至年末的话，那么2007年黄金均价将为679美元/盎司。
莫伦贝尔德将一年前强调过的八大看好金市的理由又重新提出，并解释道：“这些理由是具有长久性的，它们不会失效。”
莫伦贝尔德认为，由于受信贷危机的影响，通货膨胀逐渐抬头，美元实际利率下滑，这些都是对黄金的利好因素。但是他也指出，“美国房价并不像其他地方的房价那样高，因为在欧洲房价已经脱节。这就意味着美国的房屋市场问题在发达国家中还算很好。”
根据“房价与收入比率”和“房价与房租比率”来看，他认为加拿大、英国、法国和西班牙的房价实际上是高于美国的。莫伦贝尔德说“美联储降息更多的概率非常高。”
再放眼到全球外汇交易市场，莫伦贝尔德称，全球外汇美元储备已经超过5万亿，而其中中国就占有1.3万亿。他相信这将会引起将美元作为资本储备方式的变动，其中多数基金很有可能转向黄金。他还指出了金价上涨和石油输出国的经常账盈余增加之间的密切关联。
“原油价格的上涨使得一小部分人暴富，而他们又对黄金表现出浓厚的兴趣。投资多样化的观点和对美元未来继续走低的担忧都表明了变换美元储备的必要性。”莫伦贝尔德称。
再谈到黄金供给时，莫伦贝尔德表示，通过模型来看，西方国家的黄金产量将减少，同时他还表示并不担心央行的售金行为：“各国央行的售金量是适度的。在30383吨的总量中有4000吨可供出售。而在20世纪90年代的时候，4000吨却会引发担忧。在那时，阿根廷几乎卖光了所有黄金储备。现在，有迹象表明阿根廷有购金意愿。”
莫伦贝尔德称，不管是牛市还是熊市，金市的循环周期就是10年。“我们目前大约正处于周期循环的第6个半年头。”
在他的陈述中，莫伦贝尔德还展示了从1870年起黄金和标准普尔指数的比率图。图中显示，在1930-1933年和1973-1975年两次经济衰退中，一旦标准普尔指数下滑，金价就会走高。在早些年间，莫伦贝尔德一直将这个比率图叫做他的“疯狂”图。因为图中显示当比率重新恢复到一个水平的时候，一旦标准普尔指数达到1500，那么金价就会上升到740美元/盎司。但是现在，他不再将其称为“疯狂”了。当被问及此事时，莫伦贝尔德讲到“我并不是在预测金价，但是这幅图却很清楚地显示着正在发生的事情。”
September 29th, 2007 at 10:33 am
标题:丫太神了, 没辙
September 29th, 2007 at 3:13 pm
标题:展讯通信裁员缩编
在业界有“中国3G第一股”之称的展讯通信股份有限公司(Nasdaq:SRPD，以下简称展讯通信)正在进行裁员缩编。
这正值中国第三代移动网络TD-SCDMA商用试验网的建设规模扩大，中国3G市场已经启动。展讯通信已入围中国移动TD-SCDMA(下称“TD”)采购计划的芯片研发商。
牌照之困
知情人士透露，展讯通信目前对北京分部进行了缩减，裁员在各个部门均有涉及，缩编人数在30人左右，进一步的裁员计划还将在其上海总部铺开。
但展讯通信新闻发言人时光表示，本轮缩编不存在战略性裁员或压缩开支方面的因素完全属于正常的公司架构调整。出于公司内部考评、淘汰机制，以及对新业务发起、业务整合等方面综合考虑的一次常规人员调整。
展讯通信8月底发布的第二季度财报显示，其第二季度营收为3220万美元，同比增长8%，比上一季度增长23%，净利润为280万美元，同比下滑41%，但比上一季度增长37%。
数据显示，展讯通信第二季度来自于基带芯片的营收为2740万美元，其中销售的基带芯片几乎全部是2G/2.5G相关产品。
一位美国投行分析师之前发表评论称，对展讯有兴趣的投资人都是在看涨TD方面的业务，而对其现有业务兴趣不大。如果中国在明年北京奥运会召开前夕发放3G牌照，展讯业务将获得极大提振。展讯在TD芯片研发上比竞争对手抢先了6个月，这是展讯的优势所在。
3G牌照发放就成了迟迟没有到来的临门一脚。
易观国际电信分析师郭飞预测，在展讯现有盈利中，GSM从短期和中长期会保持现有比例或者有小幅的增长。对于公司未来的潜力——TD大规模商用，短期内还不会进展太快，这样会对其在2007年底的营收预期带来一定影响。
定位之惑
据悉，去年年中，展讯进行了一次公司战略研讨，主题是在3G迟迟不来，TD-SCDMA前景依然不明朗的大背景下，公司是定位在集成电路还是通信制造业。
在不久前举行的“2007年展讯技术论坛”上，展讯CEO武平给出了答案。武平表示,相对于芯片研发商的定位他们更愿意将自己定位为“创新的无线平台解决方案提供商”。他表示，展讯将专注于提供从芯片、软件平台、开发工具到支持体系的平台解决方案。
而于当日同步上市的两款GSM芯片和一款基于细分市场而推出的AVS多媒体芯片，以及与中兴在TD-SCDMA领域展开全面战略合作，也预示着这家企业将走向多元与纵深，它将在3G产业链上扮演更加重要的角色。
对于中兴的此次合作，该公司新闻发言人时光称，展讯不仅仅是提供芯片，支持中兴研发手机。双方的合作是掌握手机核心技术的厂家和系统设备商之间的全面合作，将共同致力于优化整个产业链，做好TD-SCDMA全面商用前的准备工作。
根据易观国际的研究，随着TD-SCDMA商用试验网的建设规模扩大，中国3G市场已经启动，至2011年底TD-SCDMA设备市场规模累计可达到1003亿人民币。其中，终端市场总规模到2011年为485亿人民币，平均毛利润率为25%。
此前有消息称，中国移动通信将在10月份对价值人民币40亿-60亿元的合同进行招标，为其提供基于中国本地开发标准的第三代(3G)移动电话。
时光表示，继8月底在上海推出的3款新的芯片之后，展讯的新款3G芯片也将在不久后推出。据他进一步透露，此前几款处于测试中的3G芯片推向市场也已进入实质性阶段，展讯已与一些终端厂商接恰合作，一些厂商手机产品很快进入研发阶段。
作者：张婷 来源：经济观察报